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Abstract 
Moving green growth forward requires acknowledging the well-known carbon dilemma facing 
all nations: carbon-based economic development versus carbon emission reductions.  Switching 
conventional carbon energy to renewable energy offers a potential win-win solution to tackle 
this dilemma.  This dissertation empirically examines innovation and technology transfer of 
renewable energy technology at the international level with its three essays. The first essay 
explores how oil endowments of a country influence its innovation paths, specifically in the 
automobile sector.  I show that a country’s oil endowment is a negative driver for alternative 
technologies, while a positive driver for oil extracting technologies. Depending on their levels of 
fossil fuel endowment, it appears that countries alter their domestic climate policy to either 
increase or decrease their dependence on fossil fuels. International climate policy could be 
designed to incentivize countries with increasing dependence on fossil fuels, and thus reach 
agreements for more rigorous action on climate change. 
However, in smaller developing economies with traditionally low capacity to innovate, 
technology diffusion is more important than technology innovation.  Technology diffusion from 
wealthier nation to the world’s poorest is the fastest way to make the transition to renewable 
energy at the current state.  Hence, the second essay shifts the focus to technology diffusion, 
exploring how foreign aid helps developing countries increase their capacity to use renewable 
energy technologies.  I find that foreign aid on technical cooperation (transferring intangible 
knowledge) increases future renewable energy production more than foreign aid on non-
technical cooperation.  This opens a new window for the on-going discussion of program and 
policy evaluation in the field of foreign aid, while also contributing to the fields of policy 
 
 
 
 
evaluation and climate change policy, especially for the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies.   
Having shown the effectiveness of foreign aid in the energy sector, the third essay 
explores whether aid allocation by bilateral donors responds to the recipient needs in the 
renewable energy sector.  Bilateral donors have been known for allocating their financial 
assistance based on political interests among recipients such as former colonies and political 
allies.  The recent trends show that they allocate aid aligning more to their commercial interest. 
The findings support the recent trends of following the donors’ commercial interest. Donors 
select recipients based on their economic interest especially through expanding their market 
having higher number of recipients. When allocating, physical proximity drives the amount 
allocated. This sheds some light on future research to explore the potential of multilateral 
agencies in allocating aid to meet the needs of the poor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPANDING THE USAGE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY  
THROUGH INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
 
By 
Jung Eun Kim 
B.Sc., Ewha Womans University 
MES, York University 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration 
in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University 
June 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jung Eun Kim 2014 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my advisor, David Popp, for the 
patient guidance and support throughout my Ph.D. program at the Maxwell School. His 
mentoring was an incredible asset for my success and I am grateful to have him as my advisor.  
I would also like to thank my co-advisor, Peter Wilcoxen, for his advice and thought-provoking 
guidance. I should emphasize how fortunate I am having both David and Pete as my mentors. 
They provided an ideal role model for an independent researcher, a co-worker and a teacher. I 
hope to be as supportive and considerate to my students in the future. 
I would like to also express my appreciation to my other committee members – John McPeak, 
Harry Lambright and Stu Bretschneider – for their congenial guidance and invigorating 
suggestions. I thank other faculty members in the Department of Public Administration for their 
advice through lectures, seminars and individual meetings. All of the departmental faculty 
member were always welcoming and willing to help whenever I approached them. I also thank 
staff members of the Department of Public Administration, CEPA and CPR for their 
administrative support.  
My fellow doctoral students were an indispensable part of my doctoral life. Their 
encouragement, emotional support and friendship nurtured my doctoral life. I thank Khaldoun 
Abou Assi and Tamara Hafner for their support and life-long friendship. I thank my cohorts, 
David Berlan, Kerri Raissian, and Hee Seung Lee, for their support in and outside of classroom. I 
also benefited from interactions and discussions with Liu Tian, Qing Miao, Tian Tang, Kelly 
Stevens, Hosung Sohn, and Kanika Arora. I appreciate their support and patience. 
v 
 
 
 
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation and love to my family. My parents, Hee Ja Hong 
and Tae Moo Kim, provided unconditional love and sacrifice throughout my life. Especially 
without my mom’s sacrifice during the last years of my doctoral program, I could not complete 
this dissertation. I thank my husband, Yougnjae Kim for his support and love. Finally, I thank 
my son, Lucas Tain Kim, who is the joy of my life for being my son and fuel of my energy. 
vi 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Essay I. Energy Security and Climate Change: How Oil Endowment Influences Alternative 
Vehicle Innovation ................................................................................................................ 4 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 4 
2. Literature Review ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
3. Theory ........................................................................................................................................................... 8 
4. Patent Counts of Vehicle-Related Technologies ............................................................................ 13 
5. Explanatory Variables ............................................................................................................................. 18 
1) Fossil fuel endowment ...............................................................................................................................18 
2) Other factors for vehicle-related technology innovation .................................................................. 19 
6. Empirical Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 22 
1) The model ..................................................................................................................................................... 22 
2) Empirical results ........................................................................................................................................ 23 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 28 
Appendix I-1. Estimated coefficients from the Poisson models with an interaction ............... 38 
Essay II. Does foreign aid increase recipient’s technological capacity? Empirical evidence 
from renewable energy aid................................................................................................ 39 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 39 
2. Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................................... 42 
3. Dependent variable: Changes in electricity generation from NHRE ....................................... 47 
4. Independent variables ............................................................................................................................ 48 
1) Foreign Aid on Renewable Energy ......................................................................................................... 48 
2) Control variables ........................................................................................................................................51 
5. Empirical models ..................................................................................................................................... 52 
6. Results ........................................................................................................................................................ 56 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 59 
vii 
 
 
 
Appendix II-1. Estimated coefficients from models with different lag structure for technical 
cooperation and non-technical cooperation ............................................................................. 70 
Appendix II-2. List of Recipients included in the empirical analysis by their time series ..... 72 
Appendix II-3. IV analysis ......................................................................................................................... 73 
Essay III. Renewable energy aid: Do those in need receive it? ..................................................... 75 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 75 
2. Background ............................................................................................................................................... 77 
3. Dependent variable: Foreign aid on renewable energy ................................................................. 82 
4. Aid determinants ..................................................................................................................................... 84 
5. Empirical Model ...................................................................................................................................... 90 
6. Results ........................................................................................................................................................ 92 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 96 
Appendix III-1. List of donors and recipients in the sample pairs............................................... 104 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 105 
References .............................................................................................................................................. 107 
Vita  ................................................................................................................................................ 113 
 
viii 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure I-1. Patent count share, developed countries (1981-2002) ............................................................ 31 
Figure I-2. Patent count share, developing countries (1981-2002) ......................................................... 32 
Figure I-3. Oil Endowment by country (1981–2009) .................................................................................. 33 
 
Figure II-1. NHRE electricity generation in developing countries ......................................................... 62 
Figure II-2. NHRE projects by technology ................................................................................................... 63 
Figure II-3. Foreign aid projects on energy by technical cooperation ................................................... 64 
Figure II-4. Long-term effects of increase in aid disbursements on the change in NHRE 
electricity generation – 8-year lag model of FD estimator .................................................. 65 
 
Figure III-1. Non-hydro Renewable energy aid from bilateral donors .................................................. 98 
ix 
 
 
 
 
 List of Tables 
 
Table I-1. Descriptive statistics of patent count by technology (1981-2002) ...................................... 34 
Table I-2. Cumulative patent counts for selected countries (1981-2002) ............................................ 34 
Table I-3. Correlation among resource endowments and patents (29 countries) ............................. 34 
Table I-4. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (12 countries for 13 years) ....................... 35 
Table I-5. Estimated coefficients from the Poisson models ...................................................................... 36 
Table I-6. Estimated coefficients from the fixed effect Poisson models ............................................... 37 
 
Table II-1. Descriptive statistics ....................................................................................................................... 66 
Table II-2. Estimated effects of total disbursements on NHRE projects from FD model ............... 67 
Table II-3. Estimated effects of different aid types from FD model ....................................................... 68 
Table II-4. Long-term effects from the model with up to 8 years lag from Table 3 ........................... 69 
Table II-A. IV estimates using the FD estimator ......................................................................................... 73 
 
Table III-1. Top 20 recipients of Japanese and German aid (1995-2009) ............................................. 99 
Table III-2. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................................... 100 
Table III-3. Estimated effects in the selection stage (DV: log of NHRE aid commitment) ........... 101 
Table III-4. Estimated effects in the allocation stage (DV: log of NHRE aid commitment) ........ 102 
Table III-A. Bilateral aid donors in the sample .......................................................................................... 104 
Table III-B. Bilateral aid recipients in the sample ..................................................................................... 104 
 
x 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
Discussions on moving green growth forward often emphasize the transition of energy sources 
away from fossil fuels toward more sustainable resources. Climate change is a complex issue 
including debates on economic development and energy security. Green growth using 
sustainable energy sources provides an option to alleviate concerns on climate change and its 
opposing arguments of economic development and energy security. The major challenge in 
transitioning to renewable energy is having technologies that use renewable energy sources. 
There are two mechanisms to obtaining technologies: developing needed technologies and 
diffusing already developed technologies. Developing technologies involves invention and 
innovation. Invention refers to the process creating new knowledge, while innovation is 
transforming the new knowledge into marketable products. Having ready-to-use products is the 
key to accelerating the transition of energy sources. Thus, innovation receives higher attention 
regarding developing technologies in this dissertation.  
Innovation of renewable energy technologies receives revived attention with the rise of 
concern on climate change. Unlike short-lived attention on renewable energy in the 1970s, 
concerns on climate change led the international community to organize an international treaty, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. 
Negotiations through UNFCCC soon induced the Kyoto Protocol, which calls for binding 
actions on reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs) by developed countries. At the domestic level, 
nations across the world adopt national renewable energy policies that include strategies 
promoting innovation of renewable energy technologies. For example, France developed a 
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national renewable energy action plan including a clause for ‘technical specification.’1 The clause 
states incentives are in place to promote development of renewable energy technologies.  
Focusing on renewable energy innovation, the first essay of this dissertation examines 
the link between climate change and energy security in the automobile sector. Measuring energy 
security by oil endowment of a country and domestic gasoline price excluding tax, the essay 
analyzes the effect of energy security level on innovation of renewable energy technology.  
The second mechanism for obtaining technologies is diffusing the already developed 
technologies. At the country-level, developed countries have higher capacity to innovate such as 
existing knowledge, the level of human resources and economy size. Developing countries with 
large economy, such as China and India, also have innovative capacity but in certain sectors. 
Although they are now competitive in the international market, these developing countries also 
had begun building their innovative capacity through diffusion of technologies. In contrast, most 
developing countries with small economy have a low level of innovative capacity. For these 
developing countries, diffusion is a better option incurring less cost in having renewable energy 
technologies than innovation.  
Knowing that diffusion is a better measure for obtaining technologies in developing 
countries, one question is what channel should be used to diffuse renewable technologies to 
developing countries. A large volume of literature on international technology transfer 
contributes to examining diffusion channels in the private sector such as foreign direct 
investments (FDI), licensing and trade. The problem with private sector channels is lower 
income, developing countries are often overlooked as recipients of technologies. In climate 
1 Member countries of European Union (EU) are required to develop a national renewable energy action plan and report the 
progress to EU. 
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change, lower income developing countries are also in need of renewable energy technologies 
not only for joining mitigation efforts, but also for adaptation purpose. Including more 
developing countries demands a diffusion channel more accessible to small income developing 
countries. In this regard, the second and third essays of this dissertation focus on foreign aid as a 
diffusion channel specific to developing countries.  
The second essay examines the effectiveness of foreign aid as a diffusion channel of 
renewable energy technologies. Specifically, it focuses on the technological capacity that has 
potential to raise innovative capacity. The major concern in this essay is how to raise 
technological capacity of recipient countries. I propose an answer to this by looking at the 
cooperative aid that involves intangible knowledge transfer such as know-hows.  
The third essay also looks at foreign aid as a diffusion channel of renewable energy 
technologies. However, it examines what determines the flow of foreign aid as a diffusion 
channel of renewable energy technologies in the first place. By looking at the determinants, I 
attempt to find out how to increase the diffusion of renewable energy technologies to 
developing countries. 
Overall, the three essays of this dissertation concern how to expand the usage of 
renewable energy to both developed and developing countries. The first essay focuses on 
innovation in relation to energy security concerns. The second and third essay focuses on a 
diffusion channel to developing countries.  
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Essay I. Energy Security and Climate Change: How Oil Endowment 
Influences Alternative Vehicle Innovation 
1. Introduction 
Concerns about combating climate change have led to serious debates on fossil fuel usage; 
however, those concerned with energy security, with the goal of an economically stable energy 
supply, often advocate the use of fossil fuels. In the search for a win-win solution to tackle both 
these pressing problems, technology innovation, especially in alternative energy, provides an 
opportunity to solve the two problems at the same time by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and decreasing countries’ dependence on imported fossil fuels. Among the many 
sectors using fossil fuels, the transportation sector heavily relies on fossil fuel use and is the 
second largest sector, emitting 23 percent of world carbon dioxide (CO2) as of 2009 (IEA, 2011). 
It is a pressing task to analyze the rate and the drivers of technology innovation for climate 
change mitigation and energy security within the transportation sector. Thus, this paper 
examines the effect of crude oil endowments, a driver of innovation related to both climate 
change and energy security, on the patterns of technology innovation in the transportation 
sector. 
As a measure of technological innovation, I constructed a panel of patent data for five 
different types of automobile-related technologies: oil extraction, oil refining, fuel cells, EHVs 
and vehicle energy efficiency. A brief look at the patent data indicates different patterns of 
technology innovation emerge across countries depending on their oil endowment. For example, 
Germany and Japan, each with low oil reserves, show high levels of patenting in alternative 
energy technologies compared to other technologies within those countries, while Norway and 
Canada, each with higher oil reserves, show high levels of patenting in oil extraction 
  
5 
 
technologies. It is obvious the different patterns of patenting in various countries correlates to 
the presence of industries. The existence of the oil extracting industry, for example, leads to oil 
extracting patents, while vehicle patents are driven by vehicle industry. However, patterns of 
vehicle patents vary among countries by oil endowment. Particularly, low oil reserves are 
associated with high patenting in alternative vehicle technologies. This paper focuses on this 
relationship between oil endowment and patents in alternative vehicle technologies.  
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it fills an important gap in the 
analysis of energy-related technological change. Although the transportation sector is a key part 
of most economies, and by far the biggest consumer of oil, almost all of the previous literature on 
energy and technology innovation focuses on the electricity sector. Second, it connects the 
energy security and climate change issues by studying technology innovation that provides a 
vision for a win-win solution for both energy security and climate change mitigation. In doing so, 
it expands the existing list of the drivers of technology innovation related to fossil fuel use by 
empirically testing the effect of oil endowment on the patterns of technology innovation. This 
study shows that decisions to innovate appear to take energy security into consideration, as well 
as climate change, in sectors using fossil fuel energy. 
In the next section, I review previous studies regarding determinants of technology 
innovation. In section 3, the theory of how country-level oil endowment affects patterns of 
technology innovation is discussed and in section 4, the patent data in this study are described. 
Explanatory variables are described in detail in the fifth section followed by the empirical model 
and its result in section 6. Section 7 will conclude the paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
Studies on the determinants of technology innovation in the energy sector have focused on two 
main drivers of technology innovation: energy price (Popp, 2002; Newell et al., 1999) and 
government policies (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Popp, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010).2 The 
heightened attention on seeking technological solutions regarding climate change led to more 
recent studies focusing on the power of government policies in inducing clean energy 
technology innovations (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Popp, 2006; Greene, 1990). Contrarily, 
studies on natural resource scarcity as a determinant to technology innovation are mostly 
theoretical or based on simulation models (e.g. Bretschger, 2005). 
As a determinant of technology innovation frequently studied, government policy 
emerges in two forms: public R&D and policy measures, such as incentive systems. Public R&D 
may initiate private R&D. David et al. (2000) survey literature on the effect of public R&D on 
private R&D that led to innovations. A series of empirical studies finds a positive effect, which 
implies that public R&D can serve as a complement to private R&D. Similarly, Hascic et al. 
(2008) find that governmental public R&D increases environmental technology innovation in 
environmental pollution abatement.  
Government policy measures are another governmental intervention inducing 
technology innovation (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Popp, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010). Fischer 
and Newell (2008) examine renewable energy policies in the electricity sector. They find that a 
portfolio of policy measures is more effective in reducing GHG emissions than a single policy 
measure. Johnstone et al. (2010) look at the effects of both price-based and quantity-based 
2 See Jaffe et al. (2003) and Popp et al. (2010) for more complete lists of literatures 
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policies on renewable energy innovation from 25 OECD countries.3 In general, they find that 
policies have a significant impact on renewable energy innovation. However, price-based and 
quantity-based policies exhibit different levels of effects on different technologies. Non-financial 
policies that allow firms to choose technologies stimulate cheaper technologies, whereas 
financial policies that guarantee a market price promote more expensive technologies (e.g. feed-
in-tariffs on solar energy).  
Regarding indirect measures of energy resource scarcity, several studies empirically test 
the effects of energy prices on induced innovation. Popp (2002) tests the effects of energy prices 
on energy efficiency innovation and finds a strong effect of energy price on energy efficient 
innovation, as measured by patent counts. Newell et al. (1999) test both the effects of price and 
regulation on technology innovation in home appliances. They find that neither price changes 
nor environmental regulation have a dominant effect on technology innovation. On the other 
hand, Greene (1990) finds that the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard has a stronger 
effect on fuel economy than changes in fuel price.  
Regardless of their focus on either price or government policy (or both), these studies 
frequently look at the electricity sector (Popp, 2002; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Johnstone et al., 
2010; Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Newell et al., 1999). However, Greene (1990) and Van Den Hoed 
(2007) are the exceptions; they study the automobile industry. Greene (1990) measures 
innovation through the improvement in fuel economy, which shows the possible results of 
accumulated knowledge but not the amount of accumulated knowledge. Van Den Hoed (2007) 
analyzes what factors cause technological change from combustion engine to fuel cell 
technology in private investment in the automobile sector. He finds that government regulation 
3 OECD is the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
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coupled with significant technical progress contributes to high investment in the fuel cell 
technology. Although his analysis provides insights on the fuel cell technology for automobiles, 
his analysis is mostly descriptive. To fill the gap in the literature, this study empirically 
examines the effect of oil endowment as another determinant of technology innovation. 
3. Theory 
Previous studies identify policies (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Popp, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010) 
and energy prices (Popp, 2002; Newell et al., 1999) as determinants of energy technology 
innovation. The literature on technology innovation does not explicitly consider the oil 
endowment of a country as a direct determinant. However, from the socio-political perspective, 
resource endowment directly relates to energy security of a country. Reflecting the 
interconnectedness with energy security, this paper posits that studying technology innovation 
may include oil endowment as one of its direct determinants and aims to identify the impact of 
oil endowment on the pattern of innovation in the automobile sector across countries.  
In the automobile sector, the connection between oil endowment and automobile 
technology innovation is not obvious because of the highly integrated world markets for 
automobiles and oil. Oil and automobile are complementary goods because oil is the dominant 
energy input for automobiles—oil price and supply highly affect vehicle sales. Customers facing 
high fuel prices prefer more efficient or alternative vehicles rather than the conventional ones, 
thereby increasing the demand for efficient or alternative vehicles. Driven by the increased 
consumer demand, automobile firms decide to invest in innovation for alternative vehicles not 
only for the domestic market, but also for the foreign market. Because automobile manufacturers 
target their products to a global market, this results in innovations that do not closely reflect 
domestic needs unless they are universal.  
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Similarly, highly integrated world oil markets mean that domestic crude oil prices are 
loosely linked to domestic oil endowments. Globally traded crude oil prices do not vary by 
country, yet domestic consumer prices for refined fuels do. The price difference between refined 
fuels and crude oil is explained by differences in the refining sector, domestic gasoline market 
structure and government policies by country (EIA, 2013), resulting in country-by-country 
variations in domestic fuel prices. 
Here, one should recognize the difference in response of a country and a firm to energy 
security. Firms seek opportunities to increase its profit under various risks. Under the energy 
security concern, firms react to consumer behavior (change in demand for alternative vehicles) 
and seek for better opportunity (investment in innovation). On the other hand, a country reacts 
to the welfare of domestic economy by implementing policy measures that secure domestic 
energy supply in largely three ways: 1) facilitating oil supply through expanding domestic 
production or foreign policy, 2) regulating consumer fuel price through taxes and 3) promoting 
alternative innovation through public research and development. Although government employs 
all three policy measures simultaneously, the focus may vary by the country’s oil endowment. 
For example, a country with a large oil endowment has the capacity to facilitate oil supply 
domestically, thereby focusing less on the other two policy areas. Contrarily, a country with a 
small oil endowment has a low capacity of domestic energy supply and therefore, concentrates 
on the other two policy areas to induce alternative technology innovation.  
Additionally, the consumer price of energy can be manipulated by government policies to 
provide incentives for firms to innovate. Energy and R&D policies in the automobile industry 
often emerge as tax legislation that either discourages the use of fossil fuels or provides 
incentives for the use of renewable fuels through tax credits. A gasoline tax is an example of a 
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disincentive that raises gasoline price on consumption. The increased gasoline price promotes 
innovations to reduce gasoline usage in cars. Firms now innovate to raise the energy efficiency of 
automobiles or to develop substitutes, such as alternative fuels, that can compete with gasoline. 
Adding the socio political aspect to the literature, the theoretical model of this study 
recognizes automobile technology innovation as having three determinants: oil endowment, the 
energy price and governmental policies. Equation (1) depicts this relationship, controlling for 
the industrial characteristics of different countries. Looking more closely, oil endowment and 
energy price also indirectly cause technology innovation through governmental policies. 
Government policies are designed to provide incentives and guide technology innovation, given 
the pre-tax domestic energy price and oil endowment. Hence, the three determinants are better 
depicted in a system by decomposing the effect of policy to catch the full effects of oil 
endowment and energy price, as in equation (2). Equations (1) and (2) represent a system of 
relationships among three determinants on technology innovation. 
Tech.Innoi,j,t = f{Oil.Endowi,t, POLi,,k, t, E.Pricei,t, Industryi,t}         (1) 
POLi,k,t = f{Oil.Endowi,t, Politicsi,,t, E.Pricei,t}    (2) 
 
Tech.Inno:  Technology innovation in the automobile sector 
Oil.Endow:  Oil endowment 
POL:   Domestic policy 
E.Price:   Domestic energy price 
Industry:  Characteristics of industries related to each technology 
Politics:  Characteristics of the domestic political situation 
* i, j, k, and t: country, types of technology, types of policy and year, respectively. 
The system estimates the full effect of oil endowment and energy price on technology 
innovation by aggregating the effects from each equation. The technology innovation for j is 
observed in year t in country i. A technology j can be either oil-use technology (oil extracting and 
oil refining) or alternative technology (fuel cell, EHV, and energy efficiency). The decomposed 
policy equation—equation (2)—includes oil endowment, energy price and politics as the 
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determinants of domestic policy. As mentioned earlier, more oil endowment steers government’s 
policy focus to securing domestic oil supply and away from policy areas inducing alternative 
innovation.4 Therefore, the effect of oil endowment in equation (2) is expected to be negative on 
alternative technologies; whereas energy price and pro-environment politics have a positive and 
strong effect. In the case of oil-use technologies, the effect of oil endowment is expected to be 
positive, while energy price and pro-environment politics are expected to have negative effects. 
The politics variable represents characteristics of the domestic political and 
administrative situation that determine the direction of domestic policy. In designing 
governmental policies, the government’s budget restricts or allows the government to act, and it 
shows the country’s preference for government intervention in the economy. Although the 
budget represents the government’s capacity to act on its policies, the government’s actions may 
also be affected by current political conditions. Thus, the financial and political conditions of a 
government directly affect government decisions on policy-making and eventually influence 
technology innovation, which is the outcome of energy and R&D policy measures. In the 
analysis, the politics variable in equation (2) includes both the financial and political conditions 
of a government. 
Unfortunately, difficulties in collecting data for policy variables limit the use of the two-
equation system. Because the unit of analysis in this study is a country, data on policy variables 
need to be comparable country-by-country. Also, a comprehensive collection of policy variables 
would be needed to adequately estimate equations (1) and (2). Examples of policy variables are 
gasoline taxes, fuel economy standards and governmental R&D expenditures. However, 
4 Large oil endowment steers government’s policy to climate change mitigation as well. However, both types of countries with 
large and small oil endowment would have mitigation policy because countries with small oil endowment would or already 
have policy measures reducing the usage of oil. 
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financial data, such as gasoline taxes and R&D expenditures, are unavailable for some countries 
or have incomplete time-series. Furthermore, fuel economy standards in countries are so diverse 
that they are not comparable in a country-by-country analysis. For example, Japan and the 
United States have mandatory fuel standards, while the European Union, Canada and Australia 
have voluntary standard programs for CO2 emissions, GHGs and fuel, respectively.5 Hence, this 
study adopts the reduced form of the two-equation system, equation (3).  
Tech.Innoi,j,t = f{Oil.Endowi,t, Politicsi,t, E.Pricei,t, Industryi,t}  (3) 
This equation allows for the estimation of the full effects of oil endowment and energy 
price on technology innovation, and approximates the policy effect by using political variables 
as proxies for the policy that affect the outcome indirectly. Given the negative effect of oil 
endowment in equation (1) and (2), oil endowment is expected to have negative effect on 
alternative innovation in equation (3). Meanwhile, pro-environment politics and energy price 
are expected to have positive effects on alternative innovation because of their positive effect in 
both equation (1) and (2). The effects of these variables on oil-using innovation are expected to 
be the opposite. Thus, the hypothesis being tested is that oil endowment reduces innovation 
activities in alternative technologies while increasing those in oil-using technologies. 
Finally, in the decision to innovate in particular technologies, the industrial capacity of a 
country is another determining factor because it is tightly linked to innovation capacity. 
Whether a country has an automobile manufacturing industry or a refinery industry deeply 
relates to the country’s capacity to innovate in automobile engine and fuel technologies. A higher 
level of technology innovation is expected when the capacity is larger.  
5 See An et al. (2007) and An and Sauer (2004) for detailed comparison among countries. 
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4. Patent Counts of Vehicle-Related Technologies 
Patents are often selected as a measure of technological change (e.g. Johnstone et al., 2010; Hascic 
et al., 2008; Popp, 2002). Patent data provide advantages over R&D expenditures and human 
resources capital because they represent the output of R&D activities (Griliches, 1990), while 
other measures mostly represent the input. Because the input does not always result in 
successful output, measures for output provide a higher proximity to technological change. 
Moreover, the ease of the International Patent Classification (IPC) system and the ample details 
patent data provides add to the advantage of patent data being a good measure of successful 
output of R&D activities.6  
Although not all inventions are patented or patentable (Griliches, 1990), patentable 
technologies remain constant and will show up in the pool of patented technologies over time 
within an industry. Thus, restricting the coverage to one industry, or incorporating industry 
dummies, can reduce such a discrepancy. In addition, a large sample size can resolve the quality 
of individual patents issues. Griliches (1990) also notes patent renewal data can alleviate the 
quality problem of the patent. 
Despite the disadvantages, the advantages enable patent data to serve as a reasonable 
measure for technology innovation. In this paper, patent counts represent the magnitude of 
knowledge production activities by country. For the automobile sector, five types of 
technologies were identified: oil extraction, fuel refining, fuel cell, EHV and vehicle energy 
efficiency. These technologies are selected because they relate to the input and the output of 
automobile use. Except for vehicle energy efficiency technology, the four types of technologies 
6 See Dernis and Guellec (2001) and Dernis and Kahn (2004) for more description on details of new technologies patent data 
provides and their applications. Patent data also make it easy to identify specific technology with the classification system. 
Specifically, IPC system provides rich information on different technologies (Popp, 2005). The classification system shows the 
nature of the patent; therefore, the direction of technological change in certain classes can be traced. 
  
                                                             
14 
 
are related to the input (i.e. fuel) of automobile use. Energy efficiency technology is related to the 
output (i.e. automobile use). EHV has characteristics related to both the input and output of 
automobile use. It uses an electric fuel source, while it includes internal combustion engine 
technologies.  
Oil extraction and refining technologies are categorized under fossil fuel-related 
technology. Fossil fuel-related technology promotes the use of fossil fuel. Oil extraction includes 
technologies for well development and enhanced oil recovery. Both the technologies directly 
facilitate the extraction of oil from reserves by building wells in the suspected site of the 
reserves and by injecting other materials to raise productivity.  
Similarly, refining also promotes the use of fossil fuel. In this paper, refining includes 
hydrocarbon production, reforming, isomerization and alkylation technologies. Hydrocarbon 
production makes use of fossil fuels that have higher production costs, for instance, oil shale, oil 
sand and natural gas. These fossil fuel sources are different from crude oil reserves. Reforming, 
isomerization and alkylation are technologies used at the end of the crude oil refining process. 
However, these technologies intend to raise the efficiency of the refining process. Thus, in this 
paper, refining technologies raise the efficiency in using crude oil reserves, which are perceived 
as cleaner technologies. 
Contrarily, fuel cell and EHV are categorized under the alternative technologies for 
vehicle fuel and vehicle engines, respectively. These two technologies clearly aim to reduce the 
use of fossil fuels. Fuel cells produce electricity through chemical reactions rather than the 
combustions used in conventional gasoline fed vehicles.7 In the vehicle industry, fuel cells often 
use hydrogen as a fuel. Hydrocarbons can also be used, but with more GHG emissions. The 
7 U.S. Fuel Cell Council: http://www.usfcc.com  
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produced electricity operates the electric engine. Unlike fuel cell technology, EHV refers to 
engine and vehicle operating system technologies. The IPC system categorizes EHV as 
combining two or more types of motors, most frequently the electric engine and the 
conventional internal combustion engine.8 EHV may still require the use of fossil fuels, albeit 
reduced usage.  
Energy efficiency technology for vehicles also aims to reduce the use of fossil fuels, but it 
does not entirely substitute for fossil fuels. Improving energy efficiency in a vehicle often 
requires redesigning the internal combustion engine (OECD, 2009). In contrast to the fuel cell 
and EHV technologies, energy efficiency technologies use the conventional engine that burns 
fossil fuels, rather than replacing it with alternative technologies. 
Given the selected technologies, I identified the corresponding code of the IPC system 
for each sub-group of technologies.9 The two key criteria constructed for the patent counts are 
the country of origin and the first application year. A patent represents the embodied knowledge 
that belongs to the inventor. The other key information is obtained from the information on the 
patent family. Patent data reveal an array of information regarding the technology, such as the 
inventor, the applicant, the IPC codes and the patent family. The inventor’s information 
includes: the name, address and the inventor’s country of origin. The inventor’s country of origin 
was used as the original country of patent.10 An inventor can file the same patent in another 
8 http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/new_ipc/ipcen.html 
9 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) developed the IPC system as a hierarchical system, using letters and 
numbers at different levels of technologies. For example, Section B includes performing operations and transporting. Under 
Section B, items B60-64 list technologies for transportation. Section C includes Chemistry and Metallurgy. Section C10 lists 
technologies for petroleum products. The lower level of the IPC code was then determined by a keyword search for each sub-
technology. This paper uses the IPC sub-class code only if the keyword search returns over 50 percent of the patent numbers 
for each sub-class. For some sub-IPC classes with more than a 30 percent return, I searched the U.S. Patent Class only. If the 
USPC returns more than 50 percent of the patents, those patent classes were included in the sample.  
The total number of downloaded patents is 286,830. Patents were downloaded through the Delphion research network: 
http://www.delphion.com/. Included among the downloaded patents are: 21,820 for oil extraction; 18,414 for refining; 57,357 
for fuel cell; 160,830 for energy efficiency; 28,409 for EHVs. 
10 Literature using patent data for cross-country analysis notes that almost all patents are first filed in the inventor’s country of 
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country to get protection in the destination country. In such cases, patents in other countries 
have exactly the same inventions but have different patent numbers. These patents are regarded 
as family patents.11 The year and the patent number of the first patent in the family are called the 
priority year and the priority patent number. After identifying the origin countries and priority 
years,12 patents were counted by country and year.13  
For the descriptive analysis, the counted patent data is limited to data for the 29 OECD 
and BRICs countries (Brazil, India, China and Russia) from 1981 to 2002. These countries are 
expected to show higher levels of innovation activities because of their capacity for technology 
innovation. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each technology.  
[Insert Table I-1 here] 
Comparing raw patent counts across countries requires caution. Countries have their 
own patent registration systems. The difference comes from the institutional framework for 
intellectual property protection and the industrial composition of each country. For example, 
Japanese patent counts are much larger than other countries in all technologies except oil 
extraction. Japan imports crude oil because it has almost no reserves of crude oil, and it develops 
more efficient technologies because of limited resources. Also, the Japanese patent registration 
system has a narrower scope than other countries. This enables inventors to apply for several 
small patents.  
Examples of the relationship between oil endowment and technology innovation are 
found in both developed and developing countries. Among examples from developed countries, 
origin (Dernis and Guellec, 2001). Often, cases show that the inventor and the applicant’s country are identical. Given 
collapsing patent families into the earliest priority patent, inventor’s and the applicant’s country are the same.  
11 Patent families are counted once to avoid double counting.  
12 Priority year was used because family patents were recognized and collapsed into one patent in the family with the first 
priority year, which is the origin year. 
13 Data has both panel and count data properties. 
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Norway is rich in crude oil reserves, while Germany is scarce in oil. Figure I-1 shows the 
technology innovation patterns, which is measured by the patent count share of the country 
total, of the two countries. Norway has a high patent count share in oil extraction, whereas 
relatively low technology development in energy efficiency and other alternative technologies, 
like fuel cell and EHV. Conversely, oil-scarce Germany has high technology development in 
energy efficiency technology, while it has low development in oil extraction. In oil-scarce 
Germany, although the difference is not as wide as in the case of energy efficiency technology, 
the categories of fuel cell and EHV show high levels of technology innovation. This suggests that 
the oil endowment of a country positively correlates with higher number of patent counts in oil 
extraction and refining technologies, whereas it correlates with fewer patent counts in 
alternative (fuel cell and EHV) and energy efficiency technologies.  
[Insert Figure I-1 here] 
The strength of this connection varies in developing countries; however, the relationship 
is still valid. Cases of developing countries are included to support the correlation from the 
descriptive analysis, but they are excluded in the empirical tests because of low levels of patents 
and data availability for independent variables. Figure I-2 shows technology innovation in 
Mexico and China. Mexico is a developing country rich in oil reserves. Although Mexico shows 
lower levels of technology innovation, the concentration on oil extraction technology is high. At 
the same time, alternative technologies, like fuel cell and EHV, show very low levels of 
technology innovation. This is similar to Norway, except that Mexico shows relatively higher 
levels of technology innovation. On the other hand, China is an example of a developing country 
with scarce oil reserves. The pattern of technology innovation exhibits higher innovation in 
energy efficiency technologies.  
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[Insert Figure I-2 here] 
5. Explanatory Variables 
1) Fossil fuel endowment 
In this paper, the crude oil reserves represent fossil fuel endowment because of their importance 
to the automobile sector.14 The data on ‘World Proved Crude Oil Reserves’ was acquired from 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The data contains observations from 1981 to 
2009. The mean of crude oil reserves in a thousand barrels per capita is depicted by country in 
Figure I-3. Within the sample, Norway has the most crude oil, followed by Mexico and Russia. 
Apart from these three countries, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have relatively high reserves of crude oil. In contrast, France, Japan, Germany and 
Italy have low reserves. Developing countries, such as China, Brazil, India and Korea, show low 
or no crude oil reserves.  
[Insert Figure I-3 here] 
Despite some variations, the overall patent activities, especially in alternative energy like 
fuel cell and EHV, appear higher in economies with low crude oil reserves. Table I-2 shows 
cumulative patent counts for countries during 1981-2002.  
[Insert Table I-2 here] 
The correlation matrix in Table 3 describes the relationship between oil endowment and 
automobile technologies. The alternative technologies (fuel cell, EHV and vehicle energy 
efficiency) have a negative relationship with crude oil reserves. However, conventional energy 
14 In this study, proven crude oil reserves measure oil endowment of a country, which provide the lowest uncertainty in the 
amount of commercially recoverable oil. It should also be noted that they could vary by technological and political changes 
(WPC, 2007). For this reason, proved and probable reserves or ultimately recoverable resources might measure a country’s oil 
reserves. However, among the dataset publically available, only proved reserves data can be obtained from the credible source, 
i.e. US Energy Information Agency (EIA). 
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technologies exhibit a divergent relationship with crude oil reserves. Oil extraction technology 
shows a positive relationship with crude oil reserves, as expected. On the other hand, refining 
technology shows a negative relationship, as with the other alternative automobile technologies. 
This confirms the prediction of the refining technology in this paper being cleaner than the 
conventional refining technology, as described in the data collection step. 
 [Insert Table I-3 here] 
2) Other factors for vehicle-related technology innovation 
Given the interest in oil and the automobile industry, domestic gasoline price represents the 
energy price that affects technology innovation within a country. From the data on end-use 
gasoline price and taxes obtained from the International Energy Agency (IEA), I constructed the 
domestic gasoline price data without gasoline tax by subtracting gasoline tax from the end-use 
gasoline price. The constructed price variable includes intermediate costs accruing to refineries, 
distributors and retail sellers, but does not include government policy on the gasoline price.15 It 
enables a test of the pure effect of the domestic price, excluding the policy effect from the tax. 
Unfortunately, the dataset lacks observations from the BRICs countries. This limits the 
countries included in the empirical analysis.  
The political party, political freedom and total governmental revenues are included as 
proxies for domestic energy and R&D policies. These variables affect energy and R&D policies, 
and will eventually affect technology innovation in the automobile sector. The political party 
and political freedom measure the political situation. They represent the government’s approach 
toward domestic policy-making. The political party of the Chief Executive of a country was 
15 The constructed gasoline price is retail gasoline price before tax. Retail gasoline price includes cost and profit components of 
intermediary actors such as refineries, distributors, and retail sellers as well as government taxes (EIA, 2013). 
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extracted from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).16 The ‘Chief Executive Party’ 
represents the political orientation of the Executive Office. The DPI identifies the political 
orientation by the party’s stance on the economic policy. The left party pursues socialist 
ideology more than the right party. I constructed the political party variable as a dummy 
variable for the left party: 1 being the left party and 0 being the non-left party (both right and 
center parties).17 The effect of the left party is expected to be positive on alternative technologies 
because it pays attention to environmental friendly activities in regard to economic policy. 
However, energy policy is inter-related with economic, environmental and security policies and 
policy-making itself includes highly complex political negotiation processes. Therefore, this 
study expects the effect of left party to be weak. 
The political freedom data of a country was obtained from the Freedom House.18 The 
data gives each country an index scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest and 7 being the 
lowest political freedom for the public in the country, for every year based on their analysis. 
Political freedom indicates less authoritative government, which may be important if these 
governments are more apt to adopt diverse options. Thus, the effect of political freedom is 
expected to be positive on innovation targeting alternative technologies.  
The government’s total tax revenues measure the government’s overall role in the 
economy. I collected the raw data from the OECD and constructed a dataset in terms of the 
percentage of GDP. The total tax revenue is expected to have a positive relationship with 
16 The data used is 2009 version and downloaded from: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~pi
PK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
17 According to DPI (Beck, et al., 2001), the left party represents “communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing” in regard to 
the economic policy. 
18 http://www.freedomhouse.org  
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domestic policy by raising the total amount of the budget, which may also raise government’s 
support for public R&D.  
Industrial characteristics in this paper include the vehicle manufacturing industry and 
refinery industry. As noted, the existence and size of the two industries are representative of the 
country’s innovation capacity. Thus, larger vehicle manufacturing and refinery industries are 
expected to positively influence the vehicle engine (i.e. EHV and energy efficiency) and refining 
technologies, respectively. The GDP of the vehicle manufacturing industry was collected from 
the OECD to capture the size of the vehicle manufacturing industry. Similarly, the refinery 
capacity was captured using ‘Crude oil distillation capacity’ from the EIA. The data was 
constructed in terms of one thousand barrels per capita and ranges. The collected data on 
refinery capacity only includes distillation capacity, which is the primary process for refining 
crude oil.  
The different levels of economic development and innovation capacity were controlled 
by the GDP per capita and total number of patents within a country, respectively. The data was 
obtained from the OECD and World Bank. Both the variables are expected to positively 
influence all the technologies because a country with a higher level of economy or innovation 
capacity would have more resources to foster innovation. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. Unfortunately, the 
BRICs countries lack several explanatory variables: gasoline price, GDP share of vehicle industry 
and total government tax revenues. Within the OECD countries, a total of 12 countries were 
selected, based on the data availability for the explanatory variables. The 12 countries are Austria, 
Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States. The time series (1990 to 2002) was also selected based on the 
data availability. 
[Insert Table I-4 here] 
6. Empirical Analysis 
1) The model 
To test the effects of oil endowment on patterns of innovation, a panel was constructed from the 
patent data of five different types of automobile-related technologies: oil extraction, fuel refining, 
fuel cell, EHV and vehicle energy efficiency. As noted earlier, this study uses the reduced form 
model in equation (3), which delineates the effect of oil endowment on technology innovation. 
The detailed model specification is as follows: 
(Patents)i,j,t = β1(CrudOili,t) + β2(Gas.Pricei,t) + β3(Pol.Freei,t) + β4(Pol.Partyi,t) + 
β5(Tot.Tax.Revi,t) + β6(Refine.Capai,t) + β7(Veh.Manui,t) + β8(GDPi,t) + 
β8(Kstocki,t) + αi + γj + εi,t        (4) 
where i = 1, …, 12 for countries, j = 1, …, 5 for technologies, and t = 1990, …, 2002 for the year. The 
time series starts from 1990 because of the limited time series of government’s total tax revenue 
(Tot.Tax.Rev) and refining capacity (Refine.Capa). The dependent variable, (Patents), is 
measured by the annual count of patent applications for each of the five technologies. The 
explanatory variables included in the model analysis are the crude oil reserves (CrudOili,t) for 
the oil endowment; the political freedom index (Pol.Freedomi,t); the political party of the Chief 
Executive (Pol.Partyi,t); and total government tax revenues (Tot.Tax.Revi,t) for politics; the 
domestic pre-tax gasoline price (Gas.Pricei,j,t), for the energy price; the GDP share of the vehicle 
manufacturing industry (Veh.Manui,t); the refinery capacity (Refine.Capai,t) for the industry 
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characteristics; the GDP per capita (GDPi,t); and the total patent counts (Kstocki,t). The model 
also includes the error term (εi,t), the parameter (αi) for the fixed effect model, and the parameter 
(γj) for the model with multiple technologies. 
The analysis used a Poisson regression for panel data, which was developed for count 
data models. The model follows the Poisson distribution, assuming the mean and the variance of 
the data are the same. In the case of over-dispersed data, robust standard errors can be used to 
adjust the over-dispersion, specifically in fitting a fixed-effect model.19 
2) Empirical results 
Both random and fixed effect models were run to estimate the effects of the explanatory 
variables on each technology. Table 5 lists the estimated coefficients from the random and fixed 
effect models. The random effect models estimate the effect of crude oil reserves using variations 
across countries, thus the generalization of the effect can be applied outside of the sample. 
However, the random effect models potentially suffer the endogeneity problem. The effect of 
crude oil reserves may have omitted variable problem. Using the fixed effect models helps in 
solving the endogeneity issue by picking up other country-specific characteristics with the fixed 
effect term. However, the fixed effect term might pick up the effect of the crude oil reserves in 
the model as well, because crude oil reserves do not significantly vary over time.  
[Insert Table I-5 here] 
Despite the different types of explanatory power, the results from random and fixed 
effect models show very similar effects of independent variables other than crude oil reserves. 
19 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) 
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This validates the random effect model as does the effect of crude oil reserves. Thus, I include 
both the random and fixed effect models in Table 5. 
As expected, I found that crude oil reserves encourage innovations in oil extracting 
technology but discourage innovations in alternative fuel technologies. The coefficient of crude 
oil reserves has a statistically significant negative effect on refining and EHV technologies, 
whereas it has significant positive effects on oil extraction and energy efficiency technologies. 
Given the coefficient on fuel cell being statistically insignificant, a country with more crude oil 
would invest less in alternative technologies using alternative and new fuels, while investing 
more on alternative technologies using oil as the main fuel. This suggests having crude oil 
reserves also steers technology innovation within alternative technology groups as well as 
between conventional and alternative technologies. 
As noted earlier, refining patents collected in this study are for cleaner use of crude oil 
and raising efficiency of refined fuel production. Given the statistically significant negative effect 
of crude oil on refining technology, countries with larger reserves have less focus on the cleaner 
use of crude oil. This country-level pattern is also observable in vehicle use technologies. I find a 
negative effect of crude oil on EHV but a positive effect on energy efficiency. Crude oil reserves 
encourage technologies using more oil in both vehicle fuel and vehicle use technologies, while 
discouraging technologies seeking alternative ways in using less oil.  
Regarding the effects of the domestic gas price, countries with higher gas prices have 
fewer patents in oil extraction, but have more patents in fuel cell, EHV and energy efficiency. 
Refining is the only technology not significantly affected by gas prices. Higher gas prices 
encourage the development of alternatives to compete with oil. The fixed effect models confirm 
significant positive effect of gas price on innovations in fuel cell and energy efficiency; even after 
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the country effects are controlled. This suggests the higher gas price induces more R&D, leading 
to innovation for alternative technologies. 
Between the two variables for industrial characteristics, the refining capacity 
significantly increases the patent counts for EHV in both random and fixed effect models. It 
seemingly appears that a larger refining capacity attracts R&D on alternative fuel sources, the 
electricity. However, this comes from the “Japan effect.” Japan has the highest patent counts for 
EHV among the sample countries. Excluding only Japan’s patent counts removes the 
significance of the effect of refining capacity, implying refining industry has only insignificant 
effects on vehicle technologies. 
In contrast to refining capacity, GDP of the vehicle manufacturing industry has 
significant effects across all technologies tested. A larger vehicle manufacturing industry will 
attract investment in vehicle manufacturing R&D, thus raising patent counts of vehicle use 
technologies. This implies countries with a large vehicle manufacturing industry gear the 
investment on R&D toward alternative vehicle use technologies rather than fuel source 
technologies. Interacting vehicle industry with total tax revenue has the same effect. As total 
governmental tax revenue increases, the effect of GDP of the vehicle manufacturing industry 
becomes more negative on oil extraction and refining technologies, whereas it becomes more 
positive on alternative vehicle use technologies.20 
Political freedom, political party and total tax revenues control for the effect of domestic 
policies. Political party does not have significant effects on the patent counts across technologies, 
which infers that having the left party in power does not increase investment in alternative 
20 The regression results including interaction term are provided in the Appendix I. The thresholds of total government tax 
revenue having vehicle manufacturing effects negative on oil technologies and positive on alternative technologies are: 12% for 
oil extraction, 20% for refining, and 18% for energy efficiency. The summary statistics show the minimum of total 
governmental tax revenue as 15%.  
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technologies. In contrast, political freedom increases investment in technology innovation in 
general, given the negative signs on oil extraction, EHV and energy efficiency patent counts.  
Total tax revenues have negative effects across technologies except energy efficiency 
technology, suggesting a country with a higher governmental budget invests more on energy 
efficiency technology rather than other technologies. This implies either a government with 
more budget capacity values energy efficiency technology higher than others; or the public R&D 
increased by higher governmental budget is successfully translated into private R&D and the 
innovation process.  
Although I attempted to control for domestic policy, it is hard to identify the policy 
effect on patent counts because effects are estimated with a reduced-form equation. Also, these 
variables include highly complex political activities that often diminish the effects of policies, 
even though the originally intended effects were strong. 
GDP per capita and knowledge stock control for the wealth of a country and the size of 
innovation capacity respectively. GDP per capita has significant positive effects on all 
technologies except fuel cell. Wealthier countries have capacity for newer and innovative 
technologies, thus they have higher patent counts of new technologies than poorer countries. 
Interestingly, knowledge stock has a significant negative effect on energy efficiency technology, 
while it positively affects fuel cell technology. This suggests more patenting activity steers the 
vehicle innovation toward using alternative fuel rather than oil. 
Grouping technologies into broader categories allows a data set to have a larger number 
of observations and produce stronger empirical results, in terms of conventional versus 
alternative technologies. Hence, I conducted pooled model regressions to see the effects of 
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variables on conventional and alternative technologies. Fuel cell, EHV and energy efficiency 
technologies are grouped together as alternative technologies (AltTech). Refining technology, 
while it mainly uses fossil fuels, is included separately because of its cleaner technology 
characteristics. Oil extraction is the omitted category for this pooled model. Table 6 presents the 
result of pooled models.  
[Insert Table I-6 here] 
The negative effect of crude oil reserves on alternative technologies persists in the pooled 
model as well. The joint test also validates the significance of the negative effect of crude oil on 
alternative technologies in the pooled model. More crude oil induces less patenting activities in 
alternative technologies in the automobile sector. For the effect of crude oil, year dummies have 
little effect. 
Regarding the price effect, higher gas price induces a larger number of patents in 
alternative technologies the same as the individual regressions by technology. The pooled model 
also results in the significant negative price effect on refining technology. The joint test validates 
the signs of price effects on alternative and refining technology. Overall, the higher gas price 
attracts more patenting activities in alternative technologies, while reducing the patenting 
activities in refining technology. This implies the price effect clearly influences fuel source 
choice. 
Refining capacity has a negative effect on alternative technology overall. Countries with 
higher refining capacity are usually the ones endowed with large oil reserves. This corresponds 
to the effect of crude oil on alternative technologies. The joint test sustains the significance of 
the effect on both alternative and refining technology.  
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In both separate-model regressions and pooled-model regressions, more crude oil 
reserves cause less innovation in alternative fuel and vehicle use technologies. Although the 
policy effect still needs to be investigated separately, a smaller oil endowment directs a country’s 
innovation patterns away from oil-intensive technologies.  
7. Conclusion 
This study tests the effects of oil endowment on the patterns of technology innovation in the 
automobile sector. Technology innovation was measured by the patent counts in five 
automobile-related technologies, selected based on the input and the output of automobile use. 
The descriptive statistics show correlations between oil endowment and automobile 
innovation, although the link seems very weak at first. Countries with larger oil endowments 
have a higher level of patenting activities for oil extraction, while having relatively low patenting 
activities for alternative technologies (fuel cell and EHV) and energy efficiency. Countries scarce 
in oil endowment have the exact opposite pattern of innovation: higher patents in energy 
efficiency and alternative technologies and fewer oil extraction and refining patents. The 
empirical results confirm the negative effect of oil endowment on alternative technologies. 
A possible explanation on the negative relationship between oil endowment and the 
alternative technologies is that patenting as social behavior also reflects the cultural context of a 
society. In countries with low fossil fuel endowment, the culture of fuel usage is efficient and 
saving, e.g. Japan’s highly energy-efficient economy. Scientists and engineers, as members of the 
society and the culture, also put their priority on high efficiency in fuel usage, which leads to 
fuel-saving innovations.  
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However, we are observing government intervention on this negative relationship 
between oil endowment and alternative technologies. A government intervenes in the domestic 
market for energy security and puts in place policy measures to move domestic firms to meet 
domestic needs. If the interventions were successful in signaling high fuel prices in the future, 
the demand would increase for energy-efficient and alternative innovations. In fact, we can 
observe many developed countries using policy measures to promote R&D on alternative vehicle 
technologies. For example, France launched a national plan for development and deployment of 
EHVs in 2009 and provides a subsidy in purchasing low-emission cars. Germany also has 
developed a national plan for developing and deploying EHVs.21  
This also has an implication on the international climate change policy. Given the diverse 
interests from developed and developing countries with high and low oil endowment, it is hard 
to reach a consensus on actions to intervene in the negative relationship. The difficulty is clearly 
emerging from negotiations for the next step for Kyoto Protocol, on which the international 
community still has not reached an agreement.  
In the same context, the major concern on climate change agreement lies on devaluation 
of carbon resources, especially for countries with large oil exports. However, the divergence of 
technology innovation given fossil fuel endowment may become a factor that hinders reaching 
agreements on international climate change actions. Countries with large oil endowments 
continue to develop technologies to explore fossil fuel more efficiently. This makes it more 
difficult to reduce fossil fuel consumption. In such a case, reaching an agreement may require 
designing a mechanism that gives incentives to those countries with large oil endowments and a 
lack of interest in reducing fossil fuel consumption. 
21 Both the cases from France and Germany are listed in the EU report from the workshop on “European Commissions’ and 
Member States’ R&D programs for the Electric Vehicle”  
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Contrary to oil endowments, the gasoline price shows positive impacts on alternative 
technologies, including fuel cell, EHV and energy efficiency. An increased domestic gasoline 
price results in more innovation activities that move energy use away from fossil fuel. To 
promote alternative or fuel-saving technologies, governmental intervention needs to keep fossil 
fuel prices high enough to encourage customers to choose substitutes for fossil fuels. However, 
this is very likely to provoke political controversy. Future work may also look at strategies to 
alleviate political controversy. Also, if the government decides to intervene the price through the 
tax system, the design of such a policy needs to include a watchdog mechanism on the 
government spending translating into private R&D and further to their innovation activities.  
Given the accumulated empirical results on the effects of energy policy on technology 
innovation, future work on testing the effects of fossil fuel endowment on energy policy will 
make the link more robust, completing the causation flowing from fossil fuel endowment, to 
energy policy, and to technology innovation. In addition, the effect of economic scale should be 
examined by adding developing countries in the empirical model. This also addresses the 
absorptive capacity of the developing countries for technology innovation. When including 
developing countries, the model should also take into account the difference in the product 
standards in trade. 
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: Germany 
Figure I-1. Patent count share, developed countries (1981-2002) 
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Figure I-2. Patent count share, developing countries (1981-2002) 
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Figure I-3. Oil Endowment by country (1981–2009) 
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Table I-1. Descriptive statistics of patent count by technology (1981-2002) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oil extraction 622 13.96 43.15 0 307 
Refining 622 13.23 33.90 0 218 
Fuel cell  622 41.51 201.47 0 2974 
EHV 622 20.77 97.04 0 1053 
Energy efficiency 622 146.76 545.68 0 4276 
 
 
Table I-2. Cumulative patent counts for selected countries (1981-2002) 
Country Oil 
extraction Refining Fuel cell EHV 
Vehicle energy 
efficiency 
Brazil 64 30 4 24 224 
Canada 379 194 317 59 171 
China 677 483 213 501 1467 
Germany 398 463 2063 1259 12974 
France 322 380 206 361 1236 
United Kingdom 413 305 226 162 1555 
India 2 20 5 2 13 
Italy 49 116 83 69 647 
Japan 240 2801 18797 8849 62668 
Korea 2 53 311 255 2080 
Mexico 21 6 0 5 17 
Norway 195 32 16 4 6 
United States 4177 2794 3061 1044 6163 
 
 
Table I-3. Correlation among resource endowments and patents (29 countries) 
  
Crude oil 
Endowment 
Patents by technology 
 Oil extraction Refining Fuel cell EHV† 
Energy 
efficiency 
Crude oil 1      
Oil extraction 0.0441 1     
Refining -0.0675 0.6025 1    
Fuel cell -0.0585 0.0843 0.5690 1   
EHV -0.0621 0.0593 0.5668 0.9121 1  
Energy 
efficiency -0.0791 0.0609 0.6821 0.8723 0.8391 1 
* Countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, India, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States 
* Year: 1981-2002 
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Table I-4. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (12 countries for 13 years) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Crude oil  
(thousand bbl per capita) 155 0.257 0.609 0 2.722 
Gasoline price without tax 
(USD PPP per liter) 155 0.218 0.065 0.120 0.404 
Political party (dummy) 155 0.529 0.501 0 1 (left) 
Political freedom (index) 155 1.206 0.690 1 4 
Total government tax 
revenue (% GDP) 155 36.138 8.433 15.12 47.22 
Refining capacity 
(thousand bbl per capita) 155 0.016 0.007 0.006 0.034 
GDP of vehicle 
manufacturing industry 
(billion USD) 155 16.646 22.141 0.045 101.362 
GDP per capita  
(thousand USD PPP) 155 30.393 7.340 10.373 46.211 
Knowledge stock  
(total patents in a year) 155 0.065 0.117 0 0.440 
* Countries: Austria, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, United Kingdom, United 
States 
* Year: 1990-2002 
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Table I-5. Estimated coefficients from the Poisson models 
VARIABLES Oil extraction Refining Fuel cell EHV Energy efficiency 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Crude oil 0.703* 0.844*** -1.792*** -2.332*** 0.294 2.112 -3.195* -1.181 4.399** 5.525 
(0.3385) (0.0621) (0.4956) (0.5911) (1.1617) (2.1303) (1.3628) (2.0817) (1.4631) (3.7525) 
Gasoline price 
without tax 
-2.714*** -2.551*** -0.687 -0.605 10.102*** 10.102*** 1.881*** 1.862 3.690*** 3.653*** 
(0.7040) (0.6789) (0.6143) (1.3440) (0.3656) (1.0852) (0.4590) (1.1832) (0.2016) (1.0977) 
Political party -0.0106 -0.015 0.085 0.055 -0.011 -0.022 -0.073* -0.076 0.021 0.020 
(0.0590) (0.0868) (0.0487) (0.0580) (0.0287) (0.0576) (0.0355) (0.0998) (0.0154) (0.0672) 
Political freedom -0.8964** -0.923*** 0.112 0.075* 0.025 0.017 -0.252*** -0.252** -0.113*** -0.114** 
(0.2756) (0.0878) (0.0770) (0.0328) (0.0389) (0.1125) (0.0527) (0.0769) (0.0218) (0.0356) 
Total tax revenue -0.069*** -0.059 -0.041* -0.031 -0.037** -0.030 -0.073*** -0.068 0.0715*** 0.0736** 
(0.0173) (0.0309) (0.0165) (0.0497) (0.0114) (0.0338) (0.0175) (0.0363) (0.0082) (0.0283) 
Refining capacity 11.097 6.585 -12.910 0.727 -28.813 -20.971 327.117*** 336.606*** -4.968 -4.344 
(29.7539) (55.0959) (27.8976) (65.3897) (20.3843) (44.0600) (29.2001) (82.2453) (13.7349) (11.1565) 
GDP of vehicle 
manufacturing 
industry 
-0.015*** -0.0151** -0.016*** -0.014* 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0059) (0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0059) (0.0011) (0.0023) 
GDP per capita 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.121*** -0.010 -0.004 0.062*** 0.064 0.050*** 0.051*** 
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0346) (0.0102) (0.0529) (0.0141) (0.0493) (0.0066) (0.0131) 
Knowledge stock of 
the year 
1.101 1.119 1.189 -0.063 4.248*** 3.848 1.395 1.177 -1.737*** -1.823** 
(1.4822) (1.3429) (1.3203) (1.2521) (0.7015) (3.0047) (0.9610) (1.7777) (0.4512) (0.6767) 
Observations 155 155 142 142 142 142 155 155 155 155 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; constants not reported. 
Mexico was dropped from the regression model because of zero patent number for the refining and fuel cell technologies. 
Countries: Austria, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, United Kingdom, United States 
Year: 1990-2002 
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Table I-6. Estimated coefficients from the fixed effect Poisson models  
Variables With year dummies Without year dummies 
Crude oil 0.294 0.527* 
 (0.248) (0.245) 
Crude oil *AltTech -5.666*** -4.745*** 
 (0.46) (0.45) 
Crude oil *Refine -0.877*** -0.877*** 
 (0.102) (0.099) 
Gasoline price without tax -7.343*** -8.109*** 
 (0.524) (0.456) 
Gasprice*AltTech 11.77*** 13.05*** 
 (0.436) (0.434) 
Gasprice*Refine 5.871*** 6.587*** 
 (0.523) (0.527) 
Political party 0.0879*** -0.00437 
 (0.0173) (0.0116) 
Political freedom 0.0247 -0.105*** 
 (0.031) (0.017) 
Total tax revenue -0.0315*** -0.0178*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Refining capacity 121.9*** 207.1*** 
 (11.43) (9.28) 
Refin_capa*AltTech -264.6*** -268.5*** 
 (6.067) (5.884) 
Refin_capa*Refine -95.07*** -89.98*** 
 (5.84) (5.66) 
GDP of vehicle manufacturing 
industry 
-0.011*** 0.00116 
(0.0014) (0.0011) 
Vehicle GDP * AltTech 0.00770*** 0.00747*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Vehicle GDP * Refine -0.00699*** -0.00725*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Knowledge stock 1.891*** 1.201*** 
 (0.478) (0.321) 
GDP per capita 0.0390*** 0.0586*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Year dummy Yes no 
No. of Obs. 775 775 
Joint Test   
Crude oil + crude oil *AltTech -5.371*** -4.218*** 
 (0.507) (0.496) 
Crude oil + crude oil *Refine  -0.583* -0.351 
 (0.27) (0.266) 
Gasprice + gas price*AltTech 4.427*** 4.938*** 
 (0.331) (0.146) 
Gasprice + gas price*Refine -1.472** -1.522*** 
 (0.481) (0.400) 
Refining capacity + 
Refin_capa*AltTech 
-142.6*** -61.43*** 
(11.43) (9.069) 
Refining capacity + 
Refin_capa*Refine 
26.87* 117.1*** 
(11.59) (9.365) 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Countries: Austria, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Year: 1990-2002 
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Appendix I-1. Estimated coefficients from the Poisson models with an interaction 
VARIABLES Oil extraction Refining Fuel cell EHV Energy efficiency 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Crude oil 0.699* 0.792*** -2.905*** -3.289*** 0.178 2.142 -3.018* -0.957 6.320*** 7.818 
(0.3435) (0.0737) (0.6646) (0.4540) (1.0893) (2.0134) (1.3187) (1.9713) (1.6142) (5.1798) 
Gasoline price 
without tax 
-2.318** -2.093** -0.068 0.020 9.977*** 10.060*** 1.695*** 1.701 3.004*** 2.956** 
(0.7245) (0.7256) (0.6264) (1.6889) (0.3799) (0.8105) (0.4731) (1.3474) (0.2115) (1.1152) 
Political party 0.041 0.051 0.155** 0.137* -0.019 -0.025 -0.087* -0.087 -0.012 -0.013 
(0.0629) (0.0899) (0.0504) (0.0581) (0.0295) (0.0545) (0.0366) (0.1054) (0.0157) (0.0609) 
Political freedom -0.819** -0.861*** 0.116 0.085* 0.025 0.017 -0.253*** -0.252** -0.103*** -0.100* 
(0.2754) (0.0702) (0.0780) (0.0426) (0.0387) (0.1147) (0.0527) (0.0801) (0.0219) (0.0441) 
Total tax revenue -0.024 0.001 0.086** 0.107** -0.054** -0.036 -0.100*** -0.093 -0.009 -0.006 
(0.0257) (0.0440) (0.0261) (0.0335) (0.0183) (0.0429) (0.0241) (0.0666) (0.0106) (0.0257) 
Refining capacity 17.948 18.259 10.703 24.898 -35.344 -23.383 315.849*** 325.706*** -32.963* -33.158 
(30.480) (45.563) (29.164) (29.994) (20.714) (54.194) (30.019) (74.835) (14.145) (31.972) 
GDP of vehicle 
manufacturing 
industry 
0.0122 0.020 0.0623*** 0.0725*** 0.011 0.017 0.002 0.005 -0.0361*** -0.0357* 
(0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0159) (0.0072) (0.0241) (0.0097) (0.0247) (0.0041) (0.0140) 
Interaction term 
(total tax revenue & 
vehicle GDP) 
-0.001* -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
GDP per capita 0.1274*** 0.1269*** 0.1427*** 0.1513*** -0.013 -0.005 0.0573*** 0.060 0.0333*** 0.0351* 
(0.0153) (0.0201) (0.0173) (0.0324) (0.0106) (0.0603) (0.0144) (0.0542) (0.0068) (0.0159) 
Knowledge stock of 
the year 
1.126 1.081 -0.303 -1.564 4.447*** 3.920 1.696 1.490 -0.329 -0.399 
(1.4892) (1.2820) (1.4157) (1.3507) (0.7105) (3.5359) (0.9792) (1.9812) (0.4648) (1.0047) 
Observations 155 155 142 142 142 142 155 155 155 155 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; constants not reported. 
Mexico was dropped from the regression model because of zero patent number for the refining and fuel cell technologies. 
Countries: Austria, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, United Kingdom, United States 
Year: 1990-2002 
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Essay II. Does foreign aid increase recipient’s technological 
capacity? Empirical evidence from renewable energy aid 
1. Introduction 
A decade of international climate change negotiation has intensified the well-known dilemma of 
developing countries: they rely on using carbon fuels for economic development while being 
challenged to reduce usage for emission reductions. Although technology offers a solution to 
tackle the dilemma, developing countries have low levels of technological capacity, which refers 
to a nation’s capacity to use and innovate advanced technologies. This has prevented some 
developing countries from benefitting from advanced technologies. Given the heightened 
pressure on developing countries, the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2008) recognizes the 
importance of environmentally-sound technology transfer for actions on climate change and 
calls for more action from developed countries. The Action Plan also emphasizes that technology 
transfer is more effective in recipients’ capacity building if it includes environmentally-sound 
technologies.  
Literature has recognized technological capacity as a determinant of technology transfer 
(Keller, 1996) and diffusion (Keller, 2004; Mancusi, 2008). Not many studies pay attention to 
whether technology transfer increases a recipient country’s technological capacity. Technology 
transfer accumulates external knowledge within the recipient country. However, the 
accumulation do not automatically increase the capacity. To better understand the link between 
technology transfer and capacity building, this study explores the effect of technology transfer 
on the recipients’ ability to generate renewable energy. 
International technology transfer (ITT) refers to technology transfer between countries, 
typically flowing from developed countries to developing countries. Most ITT occurs in the 
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private sector through ITT channels such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and licensing. 
However, lower income developing countries with small markets are less likely to attract FDI 
and licensing. Therefore, foreign aid becomes a potential channel of ITT for developing countries 
with small economies.  
According to Kim et al. (2013), misalignment of technologies supplied and demanded in 
ITT also suggests foreign aid is a better fit for developing countries with smaller economies, 
rather than other channels in the private sector. Their study compared Technology Need 
Assessment (TNA) and technologies in Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). TNA is a list 
of needed technologies developing countries identify by themselves and submit to the 
UNFCCC. Lower income developing countries frequently requested efficient household 
technologies such as increased lighting or improved stoves. However, limited markets for these 
technologies discourage developed countries’ private sectors from innovating and transferring 
such technologies. In contrast, foreign aid belongs to the public sector, thus it provides an 
opportunity to reduce the misalignment.  
This study limits its context to climate change and energy technology and focuses on the 
technological capacity to generate renewable energy. In the foreign aid literature, many studies 
focus on the education (Michaelowa and Weber, 2007; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007; Dreher et al., 
2008), health (Walt et al., 1999; Williamson, 2008), and agriculture (Norton et al., 1992; 
Kherallah et al., 1994) sectors. However, foreign aid studies focusing on the energy sector are 
rare (e.g. Kretschmer et al., 2010) and those that do exist focus mainly on the effect of FDI on 
energy consumption (Perkins and Neumayer, 2009; Mielnik and Goldemberg, 2002; Hubler and 
Keller, 2010). Kretschmer et al. (2010) investigate both the effect of overall and specific (energy 
and industrial sector) foreign aid on reducing energy consumption and carbon intensity. They 
 
41 
 
find that sector-specific aid in energy and industry hardly affects either energy or carbon 
intensity. However, they did not pay attention to the effect of hands-on assistance in aid 
transferring technological knowledge. 
Foreign aid aims to enable the recipients to sustain their economic development 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). In this light, foreign aid may aim for capacity building in the energy 
sector. Hence, I focus on the technological capacity of the recipients, by examining the effect of 
foreign aid on the power generation capacity of renewable energy. The empirical results show 
that foreign aid with technical cooperation increases the renewable power generation capacity 
of recipients in the longer term with higher magnitude than foreign aid with only financial 
transfers. This suggests foreign aid effectively works with technical cooperation. 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it tests whether foreign aid 
increases recipients’ ability to invest in renewable energy. This study is one of the first attempts 
to examine foreign aid as a channel of hands-on knowledge transfer. Previous studies treat 
foreign aid as a channel of financial transfer that increases physical capital stock. Second, it 
revisits capacity building in foreign aid with a specific focus on the renewable energy sector. 
Foreign aid community emphasizes capacity building to let recipients raise their standard of 
living by themselves in the long-term. However, studies on aid effectiveness often focus on the 
end result of economic development than recipients’ ability to support themselves. This study 
refocuses the end goal of aid as promoting recipients’ sustainability rather than meeting their 
needs temporarily.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section describes the 
theoretical framework that motivates this study. The third section describes electricity 
generation from non-hydro renewable energy in developing countries, the dependent variable. 
 
42 
 
The fourth section outlines foreign aid the main independent and control variables. The fifth 
section presents the empirical models and concerns in using the models, followed by the results 
in sixth section. Finally, this study concludes with discussions and policy implications on the 
foreign aid. 
2. Theoretical framework  
Studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid often ask about the influence of absorptive capacity. 
They frequently identify human resources (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Adler, 1965; Chenery and 
Strout, 1966: recited from Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001) and 
domestic policy and governance (Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Durbarry et al., 1998; Hansen and 
Tarp, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard et 
al., 2004) as components of absorptive capacity.  
Specifically, human resources are a critical factor in low-level development. According to 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), technical assistance enables the recipient to use the incoming 
financial resources. Technical assistance typically provides expert services to the recipients. 
When experts from overseas are involved in an aid project, they are not familiar with the 
domestic environment outside of the project. Therefore, when a local environment changes, 
domestic human resources can better manage the project. In this circumstance, technical 
assistance to lower-income developing countries is better when it enhances domestic human 
resources.  
This study defines technological capacity a national trait enhanced by external 
knowledge. As discussed in the literature, absorptive capacity is a limiting factor of technology 
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transfer.22 However, external knowledge through technology transfer increases the absorptive 
capacity for future technology transfer. Thus, technological capacity in foreign aid includes 
limiting factors for a successful aid project as well as latent factors that influence the process of 
internalizing external knowledge.  
Specific to renewable energy, technological capacity in this study refers to the ability to 
enhance renewable energy with the transferred knowledge. The acquisition of new knowledge 
occurs through ITT projects, in which recipients (countries rather than firms) become active in 
absorbing the inflow of transferred technology.23 Having developing countries as recipients, the 
World Bank’s report on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) capacity building (Watkins 
and Ehst, 2008) emphasizes capacity building at the country level. The report defines STI 
capacity building as: 1) the capacity “to acquire and use existing knowledge” (p. 11) and 2) the 
capacity “to produce and use new knowledge” (p. 11). Following the World Bank’s emphasis, 
this study also highlights the country-level capacity building, having country as the unit of 
analysis. 
Accumulated external knowledge adds to a recipient’s ability to use advanced 
technologies. In the electricity sector, this study measures technological capacity increase with 
the increase in electricity generation. The enhanced ability to expand renewable energy allows 
the recipient to reproduce the transferred energy technology, expanding the electricity 
generation. Therefore, the electricity generation of renewable energy represents the use of 
transferred renewable energy. To capture the increased ability, it is more logical to examine the 
effect of technology transfer on the growth of technological capacity rather than on the level of 
22 For foreign aid, see Clemens, M. and S. Radelet (2003); for general technology transfer, see Keller (1996). 
23 Literature focuses on firms’ behaviors in identifying useful new knowledge from external sources (Zahra and George, 2002). 
Examples of studies focusing on a country as their unit of analysis are Mowery, D. C. and J. E. Oxley (1995); Keller, W. (1996); 
Liu, X. and R. S. White (1997); Watkins, A. J. and M. Ehst (2008). 
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technological capacity. Hence, this study examines the effect of foreign aid in the energy sector 
on the change in the electricity generation from renewable energy.  
How knowledge is transferred 
In an ITT project, the input is the transferred knowledge, which includes: physical 
capital such as equipment and tangible innovations, and knowledge capital that is disembodied 
from physical capital—what Polanyi (1958) describes as tacit knowledge. While embodied 
knowledge is transferred through the physical capital, disembodied knowledge capital is often 
transferred through human resources (Quah, 2001). When successfully transferred, the 
knowledge results in increasing the recipient’s technological capacity by increasing physical 
capital or enhancing domestic human resources.  
Similar to the World Bank’s STI capacity building, the effects of successfully transferred 
knowledge in ITT may emerge in two ways. First, the transferred knowledge increases the 
recipient’s technological capacity to use and apply the knowledge to other similar projects. This 
type of capacity uses the infrastructure of the recipient country to assimilate the transferred 
knowledge and use it. For example, a wind turbine is transferred and needs to be connected to 
the electricity grid to use the electricity generated from the turbine. Second, the transferred 
knowledge may increase the recipient’s technological capacity to design and improve the 
technology. This will increase the domestic manufacture of the equipment with improved 
features; for example, more efficient wind blades for wind turbines. This type of capacity may 
lead to the export of improved products. However, as a channel for ITT, foreign aid transfers 
knowledge only to limited extents because of the low levels of absorptive capacity in recipient 
countries. Hence, this study limits its scope to the technological capacity to use and apply the 
transferred knowledge. The limited scope presents the first hypothesis to test. 
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HP1: Foreign aid transfers knowledge and enhances recipient’s technological capacity to use and apply.  
The effect of the transferred knowledge is also connected to the mode of technology 
transfer. The types of knowledge transferred determine the mode of transfer: transfer of 
embodied technology only, transfer of both embodied and disembodied technology and transfer 
of disembodied technology only. A foreign aid project limited to financial transfer delivers only 
embodied knowledge to recipients by procuring physical capital. Depending on the recipient’s 
level of absorptive capacity, the recipient will take some time to figure out how to build the 
equipment, or the recipient might never figure out the disembodied knowledge. This mode of 
transfer increases the stock of physical capital; however, it is unclear whether this mode 
increases the technological capacity of the recipient. 
The second mode of technology transfer includes both embodied and disembodied 
knowledge. In such cases, a recipient of foreign aid receives both the equipment and the know-
how to build the equipment, or the knowledge to use the equipment. This type of aid project 
includes the donors’ cooperation with hands-on technical assistance. A common example of 
hands-on technical assistance is the donor providing experts and volunteers. This brings new 
disembodied knowledge to the recipient country, increasing the intangible knowledge stock. 
However, the newer knowledge transferred needs to be internalized to make the increase 
permanent or at least to have long-term effects. This mode of transfer increases the technological 
capacity of the recipient, specifically in using and applying knowledge. The recipient can 
reproduce similar projects on its own. An example of benefitting from disembodied knowledge 
transfer is Bangladeshi textile industry in 1970s-80s. The workers for a South Korean company 
observed how the company created and kept the documents of exports and the logistics, and 
later created their own company (Easterly, 2002). The unintentionally transferred knowledge 
 
46 
 
enabled the recipient to reproduce. This mode of technology transfer—disembodied knowledge 
transfer—is the main focus of this study by looking at the effect this type of transfer has on the 
recipient’s technological capacity. 
The last mode of transfer only includes disembodied knowledge. The disembodied 
knowledge includes documented and undocumented knowledge. Documented disembodied 
knowledge consists of blueprints such as patents, while undocumented disembodied knowledge 
refers to know-how transferred only through human interaction. In either type of knowledge, 
this mode increases the technological capacity for designing and improving transferred 
knowledge. Given the lack of physical capital in transfer, complete knowledge on technology 
requires examining the detailed structure of the equipment and the process of building it. This 
requires high-level technological capacity, whereas almost all recipients of foreign aid only have 
a low level of capacity. Thus, this mode of transfer is not viable through foreign aid.  
The type of knowledge transferred, embodied or disembodied, also determines the level 
of capacity-increase. Hands-on assistance of foreign aid transfers disembodied knowledge to the 
recipients through activities such as training and providing human capital, feasibility studies 
and joint research. By categorizing foreign aid into aid with and without technical cooperation, I 
attempt to capture the effect of disembodied knowledge transfer on the capacity increase in a 
recipient country.24 Transferring both embodied and disembodied knowledge increases capacity 
to use and apply the transferred knowledge. Assuming foreign aid brings physical capital to the 
recipient, transferring disembodied knowledge along with physical capital escalates the increase 
of technological capacity. The recipient is now able to apply the transferred knowledge to 
projects requiring similar knowledge. Thus, I expect the magnitude of capacity increase is higher 
24 OECD defines technical cooperation as 1) grants flowing to recipient countries for education or training; and 2) salaries to 
experts from donor countries providing services in the recipient countries.  
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in aid with technical cooperation than in aid without technical cooperation. Given the 
expectations in the outcomes, the second hypothesis of this study to test is:  
HP2: Technical cooperation signifies the effect of foreign aid in increasing technological capacity. In the 
context of renewable electricity generation, technical cooperation in foreign aid has higher and longer 
impacts on changes in renewable electricity generation of recipient than foreign aid without technical 
cooperation. 
3. Dependent variable: Changes in electricity generation from NHRE 
Changes in electricity generation, specifically from renewable energy sources, measure changes 
in technological capacity for renewable energy affected by the influx of foreign aid. It captures 
the outcome of change in investment put into renewable energy. Changes in installed capacity 
are a better measure for technological capacity for electricity generation. However, data on 
comparable installed capacity for developing countries are not yet complete to use in long-term 
time-series. Thus, the output of the renewable electricity generation is used as the next best 
measure because it represents the output of major renewable energy activities.25 Using data 
obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), I constructed data for annual 
changes in renewable electricity generation.26  
[Insert Figure II-1] 
Developing countries share 19 percent of NHRE electricity generation of the world.27 
Figure II-1 shows the NHRE electricity generation by energy sources and in China, Brazil, India, 
Philippines and Indonesia from 1980 to 2008. These are the top five countries with the largest 
increase in NHRE electricity generation over the sample period. Comparing the two graphs in 
Figure II-1, patterns of this generation follow the main NHRE source in each country. The 
25 Other renewable activities include (not exhaustively) heat generation and fuel conversion. 
26 NHRE includes biomass, geothermal energy, ocean power, power generation from renewable sources, solar energy and wind 
power. 
27 The 19 percent is author’s own calculation from the EIA data on world electricity generation. For total electricity generation, 
developing countries share 42 percent of generation during the sample period from 1980 to 2008. 
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divergence of renewable energy in countries comes from different renewable energy strategies. 
For example, Brazil has promoted biomass energy from its sugarcane industry, and the Chinese 
government has pushed wind energy by mandating wind turbines to be locally produced. 
Although countries have a different focus on renewable energy, this study analyzes aggregated 
NHRE electricity generation, which provides a reasonable number of observations for analysis 
from the countries in the sample.  
4. Independent variables 
1) Foreign Aid on Renewable Energy 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines foreign aid as transactions by 
official agencies that primarily aim to promote the “economic development and welfare of 
developing countries.” 28 In light of cleaner development and welfare, this study focuses on 
foreign aid in the renewable energy sector and collects data from the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS).29 The database provides basic information on each aid flow/project, 
such as the donor and recipient countries, the type and amount of aid committed and disbursed, 
the project’s sector, and purpose of the project. This study uses the amount of aid disbursed to 
measure foreign aid flow. Commitments are officially written obligations by the donor, whereas 
disbursements are what have already been spent on a recipient or a project. Because creditors 
report the amount of aid committed and disbursed in the database, commitments seemingly 
make a better measure of aid. However, there is a chance not all commitment money has been 
delivered to the recipient (Michaelowa and Weber, 2007; Dreher et al., 2008), especially when it 
28 In this study, foreign aid refers to both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid (OA). The definition provided 
is on ODA; however, it also applies to OA because ODA and OA only differ in the list of recipient countries. ODA is given to 
developing countries included in Part I of the DAC’s recipient list, whereas OA is given to more advanced developing countries 
that are in transition and included in Part II of the DAC’s recipient list.  
29 CRS includes both ODA and OA with time series dating from 1973 for some countries; other countries include a shorter time 
series. 
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comes to measuring technical cooperation. This makes disbursements a better measure than 
commitments for this study.  
Energy aid represents about 5 percent of the total foreign aid disbursements captured by 
CRS from 1995 to 2009. Energy aid has grown gradually with a sharp increase around 2000, 
while the number of NHRE projects has continually increased since the mid-1990s. This implies 
donors’ growing interest in providing renewable energy assistance to recipients as the world’s 
energy focus has shifted to renewable sources. The project duration was calculated by 
subtracting the last disbursement year by the first appearance of an aid project in the CRS. It 
should be noted that the last appearance is captured as disbursement, while the first appearance 
can be captured as either commitment or disbursement. The average duration for post-1994 
NHRE projects is 2.3 years.30 The fact the project can last after the last disbursement is installed 
gives flexibility in capturing the project duration.  
[Insert Figure II-2] 
A closer look at the NHRE aid in Figure II-2 shows aid donors are more interested in 
solar and wind energy. Projects on solar and wind energy had already started to take off in the 
mid-1990s, following a heightened concern on climate change since the enactment of the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, the financial capital started to visibly flow into projects on these types of 
energy in the mid- to late 2000s, implying donors started implementing projects with a 
substantial size since the mid- to late 2000s. A possible explanation is that the cost of solar and 
wind energy substantially decreased in 2000. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2011), O&M costs for ‘Gas Turbine and Small Scale’ in the United States 
30 Given the average lag between commitment and disbursement being over 7 months, the average duration for post-1994 NHRE 
projects would be from 2.3 years to 3 years. 
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was 9.79 $/MWh in 1999 and decreased to 7.19 $/MWh in 2000.31 In comparison, O&M costs for 
electricity from fossil fuels was 4.62 $/MWh in 1999 and 4.59 $/MWh in 2000. The bigger drop 
in costs for generating electricity from solar and wind energy is a potential factor for donors 
actually implementing more sizable solar and wind aid projects from 2000. 
As previously stated, technical cooperation is a key feature of foreign aid investigated in 
this study. A foreign aid project with technical cooperation transfers both physical capital and 
disembodied knowledge, whereas an aid project without technical cooperation includes only 
financial installments, limiting its delivery to physical capital. However, transferring physical 
stocks sometime includes experts’ assistance in installing or simulating the equipment or 
machines. This portion of aid in non-technical cooperation projects is captured as ‘investment-
related technical cooperation (irtc)’ in CRS data. Thus, in constructing technical cooperation 
and non-technical cooperation aid variables, I add the irtc portion of financial transfer in aid 
projects without technical cooperation to aid on technical cooperation (TC). The rest of 
financial transfer in aid projects without technical cooperation is constructed as aid on non-
technical cooperation (noTC). 
[Insert Figure II-3] 
In energy aid disbursements, most aid does not include technical cooperation. Figure II-3 
pictures the share of disbursements on technical cooperation (TC) and disbursements on non-
technical cooperation (noTC) in the NHRE sector. Disbursements on technical cooperation 
share less than 5% of NHRE disbursements, indicating a low level of technical cooperation. This 
supports the argument of developing countries asking for more technical cooperation from 
developed countries in the international climate change meetings.  
31 Gas Turbine and Small Scale includes gas turbine, internal combustion, photovoltaic (solar energy) and wind plants.  
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For empirical analysis, I use the CRS data on energy aid from 1995 to 2009. OECD notes 
that pre-1995 CRS data is not reliable to analyze sectoral data. Because this study only uses aid 
on the energy sector, the time series is limited to data from 1995. Using only energy aid 
introduces potential selection bias because the sample includes only those countries receiving 
energy aid. However, the countries not receiving energy aid share less than 1% of total aid flows. 
The sample covers all countries receiving energy aid including countries receiving energy aid but 
not NHRE aid. This validates the use of the current sample. Appendix 2 presents the lists of 121 
recipient countries included in the sample for empirical analysis. The list represent the 
restriction from the availability of control variables. 
2) Control variables 
As discussed, renewable energy production involves relatively newer technologies. Recipient 
countries have different ability to handle advanced technologies. I use tertiary education, total 
electricity generation, GDP per capita and FDI to control for the difference. The tertiary 
education enrollment data measures the level of domestic human resources. Focusing on newer 
renewable energy technologies, higher level of human resources matters when absorbing 
knowledge transferred via technology cooperation.32 Thus, I use the enrollment rate for tertiary 
schooling of a country obtained from World Development Indicator of World Bank. Changes in 
the total electricity net generation measure investments on the total power production. 
Investments on the power industry fuel economic growth of a country. As the economy 
advances, a country can absorb newer technologies. I construct data on total electricity 
generation by subtracting NHRE electricity net generation from the total electricity net 
generation, then calculate year-by-year change in electricity net generation. In the same line, 
32 Norton et al. (1992) is an example of controlling available human resources in sectoral analysis, specifically on agricultural 
sector. It includes both available population for agriculture and schooling in the analysis. 
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GDP per capita measures the size of domestic economy. Almost all studies on the effectiveness 
of foreign aid, regardless of their sectoral focus, include GDP per capita as a control variable.33 
FDI controls for the other type of technology transfer through the private sector. 
For empirical analysis, I construct an unbalanced country-year panel from 1995 to 2009. 
The panel is unbalanced because of different introduction times of renewable energy in recipient 
countries. Table II-1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables included in the empirical 
model. 
[Insert Table II-1 here] 
5. Empirical models  
The main interest of this study is to find the effect of technical cooperation in foreign aid on the 
change in NHRE electricity generation. First, I examine the aggregated effect of foreign aid in 
the NHRE sector to test the first hypothesis. The empirical model is expressed as:
 
,
1
L
it j i t j it t i it
j
dy X Zα β δ ν γ ε−
=
= + + + + +∑
  (1) 
where dependent variable dy is the change in NHRE electricity generation in country i at time t, 
Xi,t-j denotes foreign aid to recipient country i in distributed time t from the previous year t-1 
back to year t-L, and Zi,t refers to control variables. Year fixed effects,
 
υ t , controls for the time-
varying effects common to all countries. Time-invariant country specific effects are captured by 
 
γ i  addressing potential endogeneity of unobserved variables (e.g. renewable resource 
33 To name a few, Michaelowa and Weber (2008), Asiedu and Nandwa (2007), Dreher et al. (2008) include GDP per capita; 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dehn (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001) include log of GDP per capita for aid in total. 
See Roodman (2007) for the complete listing for aid in total. In renewable energy literature, cross-country analysis controls for 
GDP per capita. An example is Popp et al. (2010). 
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endowment). The aggregated effect of aid represents the combined effect of aid on technical 
cooperation and non-technical cooperation. The long-term effect of aid on technical cooperation 
and the short-term effect of aid on non-technical cooperation might cancel out the effects of the 
other. Thus, the expected effect of aggregated aid is weakly positive in the short-run and 
diminishes in the long-run.  
The intent of this study is to test the gap in the effects between of two types of 
knowledge foreign aid transfers to the recipient countries: physical capital through non-
technical cooperation and tacit knowledge through technical cooperation. To test this, I set 
another model with disaggregated foreign aid as: 
, ,
1 1
[ ] [ ]
L L
it j i t j j i t j it t i it
j j
dy TC TCno Zα β β δ υ γ ε− −
= =
= + + + + + +∑ ∑
  (2) 
the vector of aid X is now separated into two vectors [TC] and [TCno], referring aid on 
technical cooperation and aid on non-technical cooperation respectively.  
Technical cooperation transfers tacit knowledge. It involves learning process that 
requires longer time to result in outcome. Whereas, non-technical cooperation results in 
immediate outcome with the increased physical stock. Both types of knowledge increase the 
technological capacity of the recipient countries. However, learning tacit knowledge enables the 
recipient applying the learned knowledge to other projects. Thus, the magnitude of long-term 
cumulative effects is expected to be larger when aid transfers tacit knowledge than not.  
To determine the optimal lag length, the preliminary estimations were performed from 
one-year-lag up to four-year-lags for equation (1) and up to eight-year-lags for equation (2) only 
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for the foreign aid variable. I exclude current year’s aid because aid at the end of year cannot 
contribute to changes in NHRE electricity generation in the same year.34 The foreign aid 
literature often uses 4-year lags in estimating the effect of aid on economic growth (Clemens et 
al., 2004). I first follow the convention of the literature, then use Akaike information criterion 
(AIC). For the first model in equation (1), the combined effect of technical and non-technical 
cooperation in NHRE aid would minimize the expected long-term positive effect of technical 
cooperation. Thus, I followed the conventional lag of four years in estimating the effect of 
aggregated NHRE aid. To capture longer than the immediate effect of four years for technical 
cooperation of aid, I double the conventional lag length up to 8-year lags in estimating the 
second model in equation (2). Once AIC is estimated for models up to 4- and 8-year lags, a 
model with the smallest AIC score was selected as a best fit because it indicates a minimum 
information loss in the estimation.  
Empirical concerns 
I use the first differencing (FD) estimator to eliminate the time-invariant country-specific 
unobserved variables ( iυ ). In general, fixed-effect (FE) and FD estimators are used to eliminate 
the time-invariant unobserved effects. An important assumption using these estimators is 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, uncorrelated with error terms in any time periods. I 
ascertain the assumption by using a distributed lag model. The distributed lag model allows for 
solving the lack of strict exogeneity by the presence of correlation between the error terms and 
lagged explanatory variables. Provided that the strict exogeneity assumption holds, the choice 
between the FE and FD estimator hinges upon the assumptions about the error terms. The FE 
34 Excluding the current year also prevents the reverse causation. Changes in electricity generation this year cannot affect the 
amount of aid coming in this year. However, aid disbursements follow only after commitments have been made. Using 
disbursements prevents a concern on reverse causation, which is another advantage in using disbursements than commitments.  
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estimator is more efficient than the FD estimator when assuming no serial correlation and 
homoskedasticity in error terms. However, making these two assumptions may be too strong. 
The FD estimator assumes the first differenced error terms are serially uncorrelated and have 
constant variance. If the first differences of the error terms are serially uncorrelated, the FD 
estimator is most efficient among the estimators depending on the strict exogeneity assumption 
(Wooldridge, 2010). While the difference between the two requirements is subtle, the latter 
requirement may be less restrictive and more likely to hold.  
Moreover, a unit root test of panels in the data reject the null hypothesis of all panels 
contain unit roots. The alternative hypothesis states at least one panel is stationary. I also find 
some evidence of a unit root. In this case, FD estimator provides consistency by removing any 
unit roots (Wooldridge, 2010) holding the strict exogeneity assumption. Therefore, I use the FD 
estimator given the model used in this study entails multiple time periods. For statistical 
inference, I correct for the possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms. 
Although FD estimator eliminates the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, there 
may be other potential endogeneity problems that are time-variant and country-variant 
unobserved effects. An example is changes in the details of renewable energy policy in recipient 
countries. However, this kind of endogeneity problem is very rare especially in the developing 
world context. Renewable energy policies in developing countries are very recent and thus not 
likely to have substantial changes. Nevertheless, I include instrument variable (IV) estimator to 
check this potential endogeneity in the Appendix. I use IV estimator with the distributed lag 
structure and FD estimator. The result is only suggestive with very few statistical significance, 
showing the overall patterns of short- and long-term effects of aid stay very similar to the FD 
estimator.  
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6. Results 
The first model estimates the effect of aggregated NHRE aid disbursements on the change in 
NHRE electricity generation. The model with up to four-year lags provides the least information 
loss with the smallest AIC score among the models with different lag structure. Table II-2 
includes models with different lag structure using the FD estimator. The result is somewhat 
striking. None of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. It is only suggestive that 
the estimated effect of aid is the highest from 2-year lag aid and quickly dissipates thereafter. 
The cumulative effects have the same pattern of being suggestive with a peak from 2 years ago.35  
[Insert Table II-2 here] 
As Clemens et al. (2004) note, the effect of aid on its output becomes clearer when we 
disaggregate aid into two categories: aid having short-term effects and aid having long-term 
effects. In this study, aid on technical cooperation is expected to have a long-term effect, while 
aid on non-technical cooperation is expected to have a short-term effect. Thus, I consider 
separately the impact of aid with technical cooperation and without technical cooperation. 
Table II-3 presents the results from disaggregated NHRE disbursements. Because of the 
expected longer-term effect of technical cooperation, I extend the lag length up to the doubled 
lag of eight years. AIC score informs the model with lags up to eight years the best fit among 
models with different lag structure.  
[Insert Table II-3 here] 
The distinction between aid on technical cooperation and aid on non-technical 
cooperation is obvious across all models. The estimated effect of aid on technical cooperation 
35 The result is available upon request. 
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takes off three years after the inflow of aid and increases as cooperation matures. The result of 
the model with lags up to eight years is in column (3). For the individual short-term effect of 
each lag, effects of cooperative aid are statistically significant from aid three years previous and 
stay statistically significant and positive. More importantly, the magnitude of effects is much 
larger for cooperative aid than for non-cooperative aid. The estimated effects of non-cooperative 
aid are statistically significant from aid two years previous at the 1 percent level. The non-
cooperative aid has very short-term impacts on NHRE electricity generation, which dissipates 
very quickly. Given the project duration of 2.3 to 3 years, the non-cooperative aid results in 
immediate and short-lasting effect on renewable power generation. Column (1) and (2) have 
statistical significance from lag 5 for non-cooperative aid; however, the significance level is at 5% 
and the magnitude of the effect is very low compared to cooperative aid.  The smallest estimated 
effect of individual lagged aid comes from aid disbursed six years earlier for cooperative aid. In 
column (3), the coefficient n column (3) is .3827. In comparison, the persistent statistical 
significance for non-cooperative aid is aid disbursed two years earlier with the coefficient .0158. 
The cooperative aid has about 24 times higher effect than the non-cooperative aid.  
To put the magnitude into context, consider the eight-year lag model in the column (3). 
From non-cooperative aid with a short-term effect, one million USD aid spent on wind power 
projects in China would produce 15.8 gigawatt hours per year on average. This is about the same 
as the current level of production rate per cost: 14.3 gigawatt hours per year.36 Taking the .3827 
of cooperative aid from six years ago, one million USD cooperative aid put toward wind power 
projects in China would produce 382.7 gigawatt hours per year. This is more than 25 times the 
current production rate per cost. Moreover, this is the smallest effect among different lagged aid. 
36 A Chinese wind power project from Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) costs an average of 70 million USD per 
megawatt hour (Tang & Popp, 2014). In other words, a one million USD investment in a Chinese wind power CDM project 
will produce 14.3 gigawatt hours per year on average. 
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As the tacit knowledge internalized after its transfer through technical cooperation to the 
recipient country, it raises the recipient’s long-term capacity to generate NHRE electricity 
yielding higher outcome. In contrast, changes in physical capital stock through financial 
resource transfer produce immediate results that are comparable to the current state of power 
projects, not raising sustainable long-term capacity of the recipient. 
As a robustness check for the long-term impact of cooperative aid, I impose a different 
lag structure for the two types of aid. If the current model is appropriately developed, difference 
in lag length of non-cooperative aid would not affect the magnitude and long-term impact of 
cooperative aid. Based on the theory of this paper, cooperative aid is expected to have longer-
term effect on the renewable energy generation. Thus, the lag for cooperative aid is set for eight 
years, while the lag for non-cooperative aid is set to vary from one to eight years. The result 
indicates that the estimated coefficients of cooperative aid from lag three to eight are both 
statistically and economically significant across different lag structures of non-cooperative aid. 
At the same time, the statistical significance at lag two of the non-cooperative aid stays the same 
regardless of the length of lags for non-cooperative aid. This confirms the short-lasting, 
immediate effect of non-cooperative aid as well as the long-lasting lagged effect of cooperative 
aid in Table II-3. The result is included in Appendix 1. 
[Insert Table II-4 here] 
Moving to long-term cumulative effect of lagged aid, Table II-4 includes the sum of 
estimated effects for lagged aid and the statistical significance level from the joint test of the 
sum. The statistical significance takes off after three years of aid disbursement continues to be 
positive thereafter. This is the same as in the case of the individual effect in Table 3. To illustrate, 
Figure II-4 shows the effects of a one million USD increase, ceteris paribus, in each disbursement 
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type on the change in NHRE electricity generation from the eight-year lag model. We can 
observe a clear divergence between technical cooperation and non-technical cooperation. For 
the cooperative aid, the long-term effect of lagged aid increases as the number of lag increases. It 
supports my argument that cooperative aid transfers tacit knowledge and helps it internalize. 
Once internalized, the knowledge leverages the effect of aid as the knowledge matures within 
the country in time. In contrast, transferring only embodied knowledge fails to internalize the 
knowledge and has immediate and a very short-term effect that lasts for two years.  
[Insert Figure II-4 here] 
It is also interesting to see that the statistically significant and positive effect takes off in 
different times between the cooperative and non-cooperative aid. Cooperative aid takes one 
more year to have its effect on the renewable power generation than non-cooperative aid. The 
embodied knowledge transferred through non-cooperative aid can take effect immediately two 
years after the aid coming in following by the construction of a facility, but instantly dissipates 
its effect. In contrast, the transferred tacit knowledge takes its effect three years after the aid 
coming in, which lasts and grows as time accumulates. This suggests that cooperative aid 
increases the local capacity to produce renewable energy, which aids the recipient country to 
better use and produce renewable energy on its own in the future.  
7. Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of foreign aid on recipients’ capacity to produce renewable 
energy. The findings indicate that foreign aid with technical cooperation has a substantial and 
significant long-term effect on the renewable capacity of recipients, whereas foreign aid without 
technical cooperation brings immediate but short-term effects. Although having a delayed effect, 
donors’ hands-on assistance extends the effectiveness of aid, increasing recipients’ capacity for 
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renewable energy. As tacit knowledge is internalized, recipients sustain themselves for an 
extended time.  
However, transferring only tacit knowledge has limitations in technology transfer and in 
foreign aid in particular. The level of knowledge transferred through foreign aid is restricted 
mostly to the knowledge that can contribute to raising capacity of using and applying, rather 
than designing and improving the transferred knowledge. Thus, in foreign aid, tacit knowledge 
transfer is attached to the physical capital transfer. A question for future research is then what 
level of technical cooperation and non-technical cooperation maximizes the aid effectiveness. 
In answering this question, future studies can also address the importance of the 
cooperation types. For example, technical cooperation in emerging economies and technical 
cooperation in least developed countries would take different forms. China might have the 
capacity to manufacture the wind turbine, but most of the other small developing countries are 
better off having the knowledge of how to conduct a feasibility study for a potential wind farm. 
In this light, the optimal mix of technical and non-technical cooperation will raise the aid 
effectiveness as well as the optimal design of technical cooperation customized to the recipient. 
This point is expected to enlighten the international aid community finding technical 
cooperation as an important factor for capacity building contributes to evaluating how truly 
effective aid is to the recipients. 
Another way to optimize technical cooperation is by delivering technical cooperation 
through different channels of aid: bilateral or multilateral. This suggests changes in the design of 
foreign aid in donor countries. Multilateral agencies involve various donor nations. Ideally, they 
have high level of transparency to aid the donor nations make an informed decision (Easterly 
and Pfutze, 2008). Moreover, Dollar and Levin (2006) found that multilateral donors are more 
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selective than bilateral donors in choosing recipients with better governance. It is more likely 
that projects implemented in the recipient countries with better governance reach the project 
goal more fully than in countries lacking good governance. This would reduce the burden of 
bilateral donors by allowing them to reduce the cost of monitoring and evaluating projects.  
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Figure II-1. NHRE electricity generation in developing countries 
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Figure II-2. NHRE projects by technology 
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Figure II-3. Foreign aid projects on energy by technical cooperation 
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Figure II-4. Long-term effects of increase in aid disbursements on the change in NHRE 
electricity generation – 8-year lag model of FD estimator 
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Table II-1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  
Number of 
observations Mean  
Standard 
Deviation Min  Max  
Total NHRE electricity net generation (TWh) 1404 0.06 0.49 -2.10 13.05 
Disbursement on NHRE projects  
(million 2008 USD) 1404 2.03 11.02 0 158.99 
Disbursement on NHRE projects with technical 
cooperation (million 2008 USD) 1404 0.12 0.48 0 6.43 
Disbursement on NHRE projects without 
technical cooperation (million 2008USD) 1404 1.91 10.84 0 158.40 
Total electricity net generation (TWh) 1404 34.18  174.12  0.00  3445.99  
Tertiary education enrollment (% gross) 1404 14.10 15.33 0 121.51 
GDP per capita (USD per million capita) 1404 0.0018 0.0024 4.83E-05 0.023 
Foreign direct investment (billion 2008 USD) 1404 2.0016 9.41 -3.72 171.54 
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Table II-2. Estimated effects of total disbursements on NHRE projects from FD model 
Dependent variable: Change in NHRE net generation 
  
Up to 3 lags 
(1) 
Up to 4 lags 
(2) 
Up to 5 lags 
(3) 
Lag  1 0.004 0.0035 0.0008 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0036) 
2 0.0091 0.0088 0.0101 
 (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0083) 
3 0.004 0.0019 0.003 
 (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0045) 
4  -0.0041 -0.0012 
  (0.0057) (0.0064) 
5   0.0098 
   (0.0064) 
Control variables ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Observations 968 859 750 
Number of country 118 116 112 
AIC 874.748 854.235 841.92 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Year dummies are included. FD model. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table II-3. Estimated effects of different aid types from FD model 
Dependent variable: Change in NHRE net generation 
 
Up to 6 lags 
(1) 
Up to 7 lags 
(2) 
Up to 8 lags 
(3) 
Disbursements on NHRE 
projects with technical 
cooperation 
   
Lag   1 -0.0214 -0.0587 -0.0906 
 
(0.0723) (0.0619) (0.0585) 
2 0.0395 0.0359 -0.0106 
 
(0.1060) (0.0833) (0.0765) 
3 0.4187* 0.5348*** 0.4581*** 
 
(0.1737) (0.1485) (0.1055) 
4 0.3113 0.3444** 0.3871** 
 
(0.1866) (0.1334) (0.1285) 
5 0.4118* 0.4643** 0.5276*** 
 
(0.1852) (0.1423) (0.1512) 
6 0.1736 0.3369** 0.3827** 
 
(0.1362) (0.1197) (0.1300) 
7 
 
0.5007*** 0.5509*** 
  
(0.1426) (0.1620) 
8  0.7421*** 
   (0.2090) 
Disbursements on NHRE 
projects without 
technical cooperation 
   
Lag   1 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0013 
 
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0032) 
2 0.0162 0.0235*** 0.0158** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0070) (0.0051) 
3 0.0055 -0.0028 0.0033 
 
(0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0062) 
4 -0.001 -0.0094 -0.0124 
 
(0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0076) 
5 0.0133* 0.0117* 0.0015 
 
(0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0072) 
6 -0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0124 
 
(0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0066) 
7 
 
-0.0015 -0.0119 
  
(0.0073) (0.0107) 
8  -0.0044 
   (0.0120) 
Control variables ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Number of obs. 645 542 442 
AIC 642.2 511.1 406.0 
Number of country 110 106 103 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Year dummies are included. FD model. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Table II-4. Long-term effects from the model with up to 8 years lag from Table 3 
Dependent variable: Change in NHRE net generation 
  
Disbursements on NHRE projects 
with technical cooperation 
Disbursements on NHRE projects 
without technical cooperation 
Lag  1 -0.0906 -0.0013 
 (0.0585) (0.0032) 
1+2 -0.1012 0.0145*** 
 (0.1) (0.0057) 
1+2+3 0.3569*** 0.0178 
 (0.1425) (0.0099) 
1+2+3+4 0.744** 0.0053 
 (0.2421) (0.0145) 
1+2+3+4+5 1.2716*** 0.0069 
 (0.3356) (0.0176) 
1+2+3+4+5+6 1.6543*** -0.0055 
 (0.4253) (0.0207) 
1+2+3+4+5+6+7 2.2053*** -0.0174 
 (0.5196) (0.0283) 
1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8 2.9474*** -0.0219 
 (0.6407) (0.0367) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix II-1. Estimated coefficients from models with different lag structure for technical cooperation and non-technical 
cooperation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Disbursements on NHRE projects with technical cooperation 
Lag   1 -0.0037 -0.0327 -0.0368 -0.103 -0.0697 -0.0826 -0.0966 -0.0906 
 
(0.0683) (0.0695) (0.0677) (0.0635) (0.0575) (0.0581) (0.0605) (0.0585) 
2 0.1841 0.1528 0.017 -0.0364 0.0028 -0.0153 -0.0195 -0.0106 
 
(0.1101) (0.1012) (0.1061) (0.0930) (0.0810) (0.0816) (0.0777) (0.0765) 
3 0.5541*** 0.5644*** 0.5054*** 0.5172*** 0.5320*** 0.5022*** 0.4504*** 0.4581*** 
 
(0.1532) (0.1259) (0.1106) (0.1108) (0.1117) (0.1141) (0.1050) (0.1055) 
4 0.6320** 0.5208*** 0.5789*** 0.5237*** 0.4741*** 0.4629** 0.3831** 0.3871** 
 
(0.2123) (0.1543) (0.1568) (0.1353) (0.1386) (0.1416) (0.1280) (0.1285) 
5 0.7852*** 0.6794*** 0.6849*** 0.5519*** 0.5693*** 0.5704*** 0.5244*** 0.5276*** 
 
(0.2386) (0.1808) (0.1655) (0.1460) (0.1514) (0.1569) (0.1484) (0.1512) 
6 0.7151** 0.7111*** 0.5938*** 0.4581** 0.4770** 0.4887** 0.3923** 0.3827** 
 
(0.2330) (0.1999) (0.1535) (0.1463) (0.1521) (0.1530) (0.1335) (0.1300) 
7 0.6248** 0.7742*** 0.7137*** 0.6640*** 0.6407*** 0.6948*** 0.5677*** 0.5509*** 
 
(0.2150) (0.2174) (0.1836) (0.1691) (0.1747) (0.1790) (0.1711) (0.1620) 
8 0.7112** 0.6294** 0.8474*** 0.7351*** 0.6723*** 0.7203*** 0.7738*** 0.7421*** 
  (0.2470) (0.2201) (0.2377) (0.1954) (0.1868) (0.1927) (0.2154) (0.2090) 
Disbursements on NHRE projects without technical cooperation 
Lag   1 0.0057 0.0052 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0013 
 
(0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
2 
 
0.0149* 0.0188** 0.0195** 0.0230** 0.0208** 0.0167** 0.0158** 
  
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0060) (0.0051) 
3 
  
0.0193** 0.0121 0.0111 0.009 0.0041 0.0033 
   
(0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0062) 
4 
   
-0.0136* -0.0081 -0.0074 -0.0109 -0.0124 
    
(0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0076) 
5 
    
0.0078 0.0039 0.0036 0.0015 
     
(0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0072) 
6 
     
-0.0057 -0.0116* -0.0124 
      
(0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0066) 
7 
      
-0.009 -0.0119 
       
(0.0064) (0.0107) 
8 
       
-0.0044 
         (0.0120) 
Tertiary education -0.0120* -0.0111* -0.0106* -0.0100* -0.0093* -0.0096* -0.0084* -0.0086* 
 
(0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0040) 
Change in total electricity -0.0042 -0.0015 -0.0043 -0.0122 -0.0126 -0.0097 -0.0102 -0.0078 
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generation (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0119) 
GDP per million capita 53.6797* 41.4892* 32.8405 32.3561 30.2589 31.1047 22.4985 20.5344 
 
(26.6423) (20.7262) (19.5793) (19.5039) (19.7825) (19.6635) (18.5998) (20.1404) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.0106 0.0023 0.0177 0.0116 0.0191 0.019 0.0228 0.024 
  (0.0160) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0176) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0216) 
Constant  0.1903 0.1407 0.1632 0.1731 0.1876 0.2138 0.2138 0.2123 
 
(0.1851) (0.1732) (0.1653) (0.1664) (0.1685) (0.1728) (0.1656) (0.1669) 
Number of obs. 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 
AIC 479.431 454.726 432.418 417.715 412.669 410.174 406.203 407.508 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Year dummies are included. FD model. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Appendix II-2. List of Recipients included in the empirical analysis by their time series 
1995-2009 1995-2008 1995-2007 1995-2001 1998-2008 
Algeria Guyana Argentina Samoa Tajikistan 
Brazil Honduras Bolivia Vietnam 
 Burkina Faso Indonesia Cote d'Ivoire 
 
1998-2004 
China Iran Guatemala 1995-2000 Vanuatu 
Kazakhstan Jamaica India Equatorial Guinea 
 Pakistan Jordan Malawi Liberia 2000-2008 
St. Lucia Kenya Paraguay Sudan Afghanistan 
 
Kyrgyz Republic Togo Zambia 
 1995-2008 Laos Yemen 
 
2001-2009 
Armenia Madagascar 
 
1995-1999 Oman 
Azerbaijan Malaysia 1995-2006 Gabon 
 Bangladesh Mali Angola Papua New Guinea 2001-2008 
Burundi Mauritania Benin 
 
Lebanon 
Cambodia Mauritius Botswana 1996-2008 
 Cameroon Mexico Guinea-Bissau Croatia 2002-2008 
Cape Verde Mongolia Lesotho Georgia Belize 
Central African 
Republic Morocco Peru 
 
Bhutan 
Chad Niger Swaziland 1996-2004 
 Chile Panama 
 
Albania 2002-2006 
Colombia Philippines 1995-2004 
 
Maldives 
Comoros Rwanda Dominican Republic 1996-2002 
 Congo, Dem. Rep. Senegal Nepal Iraq 2004-2009 
Congo, Rep. St. Kitts and Nevis Tonga 
 
East Timor 
Cuba Thailand 
 
1997-2008 
 Djibouti Tunisia 1995-2003 Macedonia 2004-2007 
Dominica Turkey Nicaragua Moldova Saudi Arabia 
Ecuador Uganda 
   Egypt Uruguay 1995-2002 1998-2009 2005-2008 
El Salvador Venezuela Sierra Leone Uzbekistan Belarus 
Eritrea Zimbabwe Slovenia Costa Rica 
 Ethiopia Namibia Suriname Fiji 2006-2008 
Ghana Gambia 
 
Mozambique 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Guinea 
  
Nigeria Serbia 
   
Tanzania 
 
   
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
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Appendix II-3. IV analysis  
I use the IV estimator to check the unbiased coefficients of the FD estimator in the 
presence of the other types of endogeneity other than omitted variable bias. I instrument the 
aggregated aid on NHRE for the model (1) and the disaggregated aid on NHRE (TC and TCno) 
in the model (2). For the aggregated aid, the excluded variable is the total aid excluding the 
energy aid. The key for a good instrument is having correlation with the instrumented variable 
(the aid in this study) and no correlation with the dependent variable (the renewable electricity 
generation). Thus, I excluded environmental aid that might have correlation with renewable 
energy.   Running the IV model for disaggregated aid on NHRE, I instrumented the 
disaggregated aid by disaggregated aid in other sectors: 37 I combined IV and the FD estimator 
with robust standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
Table II-A. IV estimates using the FD estimator 
Dependent variable: Change in NHRE net generation 
 Disbursements on NHRE projects 
with technical cooperation 
Disbursements on NHRE projects 
without technical cooperation 
Lag  1 -0.6337* 0.0064 
 (0.3076) (0.0069) 
2 -0.356 0.0133* 
 (0.2218) (0.0055) 
3 0.2361 -0.0014 
 (0.1611) (0.0066) 
4 0.1943 -0.0223* 
 (0.1548) (0.0092) 
5 0.3377* -0.0049 
 (0.1688) (0.0076) 
6 0.2189 -0.0159* 
 (0.1508) (0.0064) 
7 0.6399*** -0.0117 
 (0.1894) (0.0108) 
8 0.7589*** 0.0008 
 (0.1863) (0.0128) 
Control variables √  
Observations 442  
First stage F statistics 5.93 11.03 
Number of country 103  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Year dummies are included. FD model. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
37 For disaggregated aid, instruments are technical cooperation and non-technical cooperation aid in banking and financial 
services; communications; other commodity assets; and trade policies and regulations. 
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Except for the estimated coefficients from lag 7 and 8 for technical cooperation, the 
statistical significance is reduced or disappeared compared to the results from the FD estimator 
in Table II-3. This is partly because of the noise added by using IV strategy because the IV 
estimator requires more variables to be included in the model. The weaker first-stage F statistics 
support the added noise in the IV estimator. Instruments are strong for non-technical 
cooperation and somewhat weaker for technical cooperation. Although the statistical 
significance mostly disappears, estimated coefficients for cooperative aid from lags 7 and 8 stays 
the same regarding the statistical significance and have very similar magnitude from the first 
differencing model in Table II-3. The delayed effect of cooperative aid is robust.  
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Essay III. Renewable energy aid: Do those in need receive it?  
1. Introduction 
Concerns on climate change have highlighted cleaner energy options for developing countries to 
tackle both climate and developmental challenges. As one channel to help developing countries, 
foreign aid increasingly recognizes renewable energy as a sector to address the needs of the poor. 
Since the start of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 1997, foreign aid on renewable energy has 
continually increased. OECD’s assessment (2010) on energy Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) reveals that donors increased aid for renewable energy on average 16 percent annually 
between 2003 and 2008. However, findings from previous studies on general aid suggest aid 
allocation addresses donor interests rather than the needs of the poor. Specific to the renewable 
energy sector, this study investigates what factors determine the aid flow in this sector and 
whether sectoral aid serves the needs of the poor.  
The work by McKinley and Little (1979) first introduced a typology of aid determinants: 
donor interests and recipient needs. Since their work, studies found that donor interests, 
including political and commercial interests, are the major aid determinants rather than 
recipient needs (McKinley & Little, 1979; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; 
McGillivray, 2003). More recent studies add good governance to the aid allocation typology 
(Collier and Dollar, 2002; Neumeyer, 2003). Motivated by findings in aid effectiveness literature 
(e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000), they examine the effect of good governance in recipient 
countries on aid received. However, their results send mixed signals on whether good 
governance matters for donors in aid allocation.38 Most recently, another stream of studies on 
aid allocation emerged. This group of studies adopts the gravity framework of international 
38 For a more comprehensive list of literature, see Neumeyer (2003). 
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trade flow (Clist et al., 2012; Duchesne, 2012). These studies add physical and social proximity 
to the typology of aid determinants.  
Historically, aid studies have analyzed general aid. Thiele et al. (2006) point out the need 
for more sectoral analysis on aid. Highlighting foreign aid can also achieve the poverty-reduction 
goal using other means instead of economic growth (McGillivray, 2003). Moreover, the flow of 
aid is not solely the donor’s choice. Both the donor’s decision and recipient’s agreement on the 
aid contract determines the aid flow. From the recipient’s viewpoint, the ultimate goal (of 
goodwill) in receiving aid is to obtain needed technologies and be able to manipulate them 
without continuing assistance from donors so the recipient develops a sustainable economy and 
increases exports in the future.  Recipients seek donors who can provide technological expertise 
if possible.  However, recipients cannot select donors.  The only time recipients can shape aid 
flow is when negotiating aid project agreements.  During the negotiation, recipients can align 
the donor intention with their own intention, distributing aid among sectors.  
Renewable energy reduces poverty by providing more of the population with access to 
energy. Nevertheless, only a small group of studies focused on aid allocation at the sector level: 
for example, food aid (Neumeyer, 2005; Duchesne et al., 2012), emergency aid (Fink & Redaelli, 
2011), and sectors linked to Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Thiele et al., 2006). This 
limited focus on sectoral aid has resulted in energy aid not receiving much attention in the aid 
literature. This study fills this gap by examining the patterns of aid flow in the renewable energy 
sector and contributes to the literature by empirically studying determinants of this aid flow.   
Methodologically, I adopt the gravity model of international trade to describe the aid 
flow from a donor to a recipient following Duchesne et al. (2012). I model aid flow as 
proportional to the outcome of aid in a donor and a recipient, and inversely proportional to the 
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distance between them. I use four categories of determinants from the existing literature: donor 
political interests, donor commercial interests, recipient needs and good governance. In many 
cases, aid determinant literature analyzes total aid flow. Subsets of total aid are expected to have 
similar effects of determinants with variation in magnitude.  Because renewable energy aid is a 
subset of the total aid, I hypothesize all four categories have some level of positive impact on aid 
flow in the renewable energy sector.  
In the next section, I review aid allocation literature and provide a theory of 
determinants for aid allocation in the renewable energy sector. In section 3, I describe foreign aid 
flow—the dependent variable—in the renewable energy sector. I then visit independent 
variables and provide how to measure them in section 4. Section 5 introduces the empirical 
model used in this paper. Results are presented in section 6, followed by the conclusion. 
2. Background 
In aid allocation literature, McKinley and Little (1979) set up the framework of donor interests 
and recipient needs exclusively determining aid allocation. However, later studies used more 
hybrid approaches in assessing aid allocation (e.g. Bethelemy, 2006; Clist et al., 2012). The 
literature generally finds that donor interests weigh heavier than recipient needs, specifically 
donor political interests (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet, 2006; Ali and Isse, 2006) and donor 
commercial interests (Ali and Isse, 2006; for aid-trade literature see McGillivray, 2003; Wagner, 
2003; Osei et al., 2004). Recently, some studies argue that donor sensitivity has increased on 
recipient needs in allocating aid after the Cold War (Classens et al., 2007; Clist et al, 2012).  
Borrowing from aid effectiveness literature, studies on aid allocation focus on donors’ 
selectivity regarding governance and policies after the end of the Cold War era. Good 
governance is to protect the human, political and civil rights of the public in a country 
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(Neumeyer, 2003). Studies often proxy good governance with, for example, democracy 
(McKinley and Little, 1979; Neumeyer, 2003), political stability (McKinley and Little, 1979), 
political rights (Wall, 1995; Svensson, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000), or corruption (Neumeyer, 
2003).39 Most studies on good governance argue that donors allocate aid to recipient countries 
who perform better governance or have better policies than others, and empirically found the 
argument valid (Neumeyer, 2003; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Berthelemy, 2006).40 On the other 
hand, some studies argue that donors allocate aid to recipient countries with bad policies so an 
aid project results in policy reform, thereby raising aid effectiveness (e.g. Svenssen, 2003). The 
diverted arguments produce mixed results on the effect of good governance. Nevertheless, the 
policy reform is induced from the aid, which aims to restructure a recipient’s economy. Hence, 
good governance in recipients attracts more attention from donors. 
A newly observed group of studies incorporates gravity framework of international trade 
flow (Dollar & Levin, 2006; Clist et al., 2012; Duchesne et al., 2012). The gravity model describes 
international bilateral trade as proportional to products of trade from each partner and inversely 
proportional to the distance between the two partners (Duchesne et al., 2012). Literature 
typically used the gravity model when examining the effect of aid on trade rather than studying 
determinants of aid allocation. However, Dollar and Levin (2006) and Clist et al. (2012) use the 
concept of gravity, although not using the gravity model itself. Dollar and Levin (2006) used 
distance between a donor and a recipient when examining aid selectivity on recipient’s 
governance. Clist et al. (2012) categorized determinants of aid allocation into four categories: 
Poverty, Population, Policy and Proximity. The concept of the Proximity factor is close to the 
resistance to trade in trade literature using the gravity model. Clist et al. (2012) specifically used 
39 For more detailed description of literature, see Neumeyer (2003) 
40 However, Alesina and Weber (2002) found no evidence of aid allocation favoring less corrupt governments. 
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a dummy variable for the same official language between a donor and a recipient to examine 
general aid allocation. Comparably, Duchesne et al. (2012) used the gravity model in examining 
food aid allocation. They included distance between a donor and a recipient to measure the 
gravity effect. However, Duchesne et al. (2012) focus on the food aid. Thus, this study will be one 
of the first studies that analyzes aid allocation in the renewable energy sector using the gravity 
model.  
Aid flow in the renewable energy sector 
Aid literature has not focused on renewable energy aid because it makes up only a small fraction 
of total aid. However, global actions on climate change move donors to increase renewable 
energy aid (OECD, 2010). The global community is increasingly pressing developing countries to 
participate in the mandatory climate change actions. Efforts to attract developing countries into 
the action at the multilateral level emerged as newly created climate change funds.41 In line with 
these efforts, bilateral donors also increased aid on renewable energy in the last decade. 
However, it is unclear why bilateral donors provide renewable energy aid—whether they align 
their motivation with the global efforts or their own interests. If donors follow their own 
interests, bilateral aid would overlook recipient needs. This will decreases aid effectiveness on 
achieving poverty reduction. In this regard, discovering motivation of bilateral donors in giving 
renewable energy aid sheds light on raising the effectiveness of renewable energy aid. 
The attention on renewable energy revived after the late-1990s when the KP was ratified. 
As mentioned earlier, the post-Cold War environment diluted donor political interests in 
providing aid. However, donor political interests emerged in a different form. Specific to climate 
change, donors invest in developing countries to induce their participation in the mandatory 
41 Examples are: Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund, Special Climate Change Fund and Least Developed Countries Fund. 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets. Therefore, donors strategically give renewable energy 
aid to recipients. This might signal a reduced burden in climate change action to the recipient 
countries.  
Another frequently considered donor interest that significantly emerged in the Post-Cold 
war era is of the commercial nature; it is one that seeks economic opportunities for the donors’ 
own countries in giving aid. (Claessens et al., 2007). Dollar and Levin (2006) also support this 
change in donor focus from political to economic. The commercial interest of donors is 
extensively studied in relation to international trade (e.g. Wagner, 2003; Nelson and Silva, 
2008), by maintaining the donor-recipient relationship with trade partners (Lloyd et al., 2000; 
Wagner, 2003). Donors give aid to a country that imports their goods and services expecting 
continued exports to the recipient. Therefore, the recipient buys goods and services from the 
donor to secure future aid from them. In other words, donors secure their exports while 
recipients secure the income of foreign aid.  
Martens (2005) suggests another view on commercial interests. He argues donors use 
foreign aid to position commercial firms of the donor’s home country in the global market. In 
this case, donors transfer aid to as many recipient countries as possible to set the technological 
standard. Becoming a widely used standard suggests more markets for their products, i.e. 
increasing exports. Thus, donors expand their commercial influence in many recipient countries. 
Furthermore, having more recipient countries also expands donors’ political influence over 
wider regions.  
In the case of the renewable energy sector, donors prefer expanding the list of recipients 
because renewable energy technologies are emerging technologies in the global market. As 
donors assist many recipient countries with their own renewable technologies, there is higher 
  
81 
 
chance of becoming the global standard. Considering the first-mover advantage, being a global 
standard is a strong economic incentive for donors in giving aid.42  
Together with commercial interests, the end of the Cold War and the rise of 
globalization re-highlighted good governance and better policy in recipient countries. As stated 
previously, weaker donor political interests after the Cold War made donors refocus on aid 
effectiveness. Donors seek good governance in recipients for the most output given the aid they 
input. Recipients with good governance provide a better environment in aid use by avoiding 
corruption and having transparency. Thus, good governance sends a signal to donors that the 
recipient country has a willingness to solve its developmental problems. Similarly, a country 
with better political rights pursues the needs of its people. Hence, donors allocate their aid to 
recipients with better governance (Neumeyer, 2003). Previous studies examined good 
governance on general aid allocation. Given the same process in general and sectoral aid 
distribution, this good governance argument is also valid for the renewable energy sector. 
Similar to the good governance, sector-specific domestic policies show the willingness of 
a recipient country in solving developmental problems in the specific sector. In the renewable 
energy sector, a better policy environment signals donors that a recipient country is an effective 
candidate for their renewable energy aid if allocated. However, presence of such policies does 
not guarantee they are well practiced and donors recognize that policy effectiveness is unclear. 
Unfortunately, donors cannot gauge the effectiveness of policies until long after aid has been 
disbursed. Thus, the presence of policy is what donors must use to measure recipients’ 
effectiveness at best. 
42 From the recipients’ perspective, aid is most effective when it supports neglected technologies that are not viewed as 
profitable by firms in developed countries, but needed in developing countries. In this case, being a global standard is not as 
strong of an incentive for donors because of the low market potential of supported goods. However, in practice, it is unclear 
that renewable energy aid supports the neglected energy technologies. 
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In theory, aid flow reflects recipient needs in the renewable energy sector because of 
both donor strategic interests (to include developing countries in the binding agreement) and 
recipient needs (energy needs for development).  Hence, I examine what determines aid flow in 
the renewable energy sector and attempt to answer which donor interests and recipient needs 
are the stronger driver of renewable energy aid. 
3. Dependent variable: Foreign aid on renewable energy 
Data on foreign aid flowing into the NHRE sector is constructed from OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) from 1995 to 2009. OECD notes that CRS data at the sector level are 
reliable only after 1995 when the reporting was improved. Because previous studies note that 
bilateral and multilateral aids are different and better to be analyzed separately (Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984), this study limits its scope to bilateral aid using 
commitment data, which represent donor’s willingness and interest in a recipient country 
(Neumeyer, 2003).43  
[Insert Figure III-1 here] 
This study focuses on foreign aid for the non-hydro renewable energy sector. Figure III-1 
plots the number of bilateral NHRE projects starting each year and the amount of commitments 
on bilateral NHRE projects in the pipeline each year. During the sample period of 1995-2009, the 
number of projects continuously increases by almost 8 fold, implying donors’ increasing 
attention on NHRE use in developing countries. The fast increasing attention on NHRE is 
supported by the upward trend of donors’ commitments starting from late 1990s, when the 
global community became more serious on combating climate change. For example, the KP was 
43 Commitments are the amount of financial resources donors promise to give to recipients. A comparable concept is 
disbursements that are the amount of financial resources already spent in implementing aid projects. 
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signed in 1997 with binding reduction targets of developed countries.44 The fast increase 
motivates to study why donors give aid in the NHRE sector and whether they give it to those in 
need. 
Breaking down to donor-to-donor aid, Japan and Germany are the two biggest bilateral 
donors in NHRE aid.45 Table III-1 shows top recipient countries in total energy and NHRE aids 
from Japan and Germany. There are different trends of each donor in aid allocation. For Japanese 
aid, African and Southeast Asian countries appear at the upper rank in both total energy and 
NHRE aid. German aid mostly flows into Central Europe and South Asia such as Serbia, 
Armenia, Turkey, Pakistan and Nepal. The regional concentration sheds some light on the 
physical proximity driving the aid allocation. This motivates the use of the gravity model in this 
study.  
[Insert Table III-1 here] 
The difference in regional concentration by donors supports the argument of donors’ 
political and economic interests. If the aid allocation is solely on the imperatives of the 
recipients, virtually all donors would allocate their resources following very similar regional 
distribution. However, the diverse regional concentration of donors indicates the aid allocation 
process is strategic. The next section presents what are the potential factors in this strategic 
donor behavior.  
44 CRS data, by definition, does not include financial flow for the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) of the KP. However, 
actual data include some of feasibility studies for CDM projects. I follow the definition of CRS data and regard observations 
for CDM feasibility studies as noise in the data. 
45 USA is ranked at 2nd for total energy aid but at 10th for NHRE aid among 25 donor countries during the sample period 1995-
2009. Author’s own calculation. 
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4. Aid determinants 
Drawing upon the determining factors of aid in previous studies, the aid flow model includes 
four determinants: donor political interests, donor commercial interests, recipient good 
governance, and recipient needs. Because energy aid is a subset of total aid, previously identified 
factors of aid allocation at the aggregated level determine allocation of energy aid. However, 
sectoral determinants are not to be overlooked. The aid flow model thus includes energy sector-
specific determinants in each category of determinants. Using a gravity equation, I add potential 
determinants of aid allocation from the gravity equation as well.  
Political interests 
Political interests were a strong driver of aid allocation, especially during the Cold War era. 
Considering that the majority of donors were western democracies, the motivation of aid giving 
was to keep the recipients on their political side. After the Cold war, donor political interests 
became focused on maintaining established political influence and practicing their foreign policy 
strategies with the recipients.  
Previous studies identified political interests a strong driver of aid allocation by bilateral 
donors (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet, 2006; Berthelemy, 2006; Clist, 2011).  They measured 
political interests with former colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and UN allies (Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011).  Aid giving to donor’s former colonies clearly indicates 
donor interests in maintaining political influence of the recipient’s domestic affairs and being 
UN allies assumes to have the same geopolitical interests between a donor and its aid recipients. 
However, the inference is unclear whether being UN allies induces aid allocation or if aid 
recipients become UN allies. Considering this unclear inference link, I use the former colonial 
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link downloaded from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) to measure donor political interests.   
More directly than being UN allies, donor political interests in a particular recipient are 
developed through migrants from the recipient country. Bermeo and Leblang (2010) argue that 
migrant interest groups lobby for more aid allocation to their country of origin and found the 
argument statistically sustained. Borrowing from them, I use immigrating population from a 
recipient country to a donor’s country to measure donor’s political interest through migrant 
interest groups. Increased immigration from a recipient country makes the interest group for the 
population politically stronger. The interest group with political strength succeeds in lobbying 
for more economic assistance to their country of origin. Hence, the effect of immigration is 
expected to be positive on aid flow in general, thus positive for the renewable energy sector as 
well. 
Specific to energy, aid to recipients with crude oil or natural gas endowment measures 
donor geopolitical interests. Donors allocate aid to recipients in an attempt to continue imports 
of energy resources from the recipients. Thus, I use imports of crude oil and natural gas rather 
than the endowment to measure donors’ geopolitical interests. The imports indicate that a 
donor-recipient pair has a historical relationship regarding energy resources as well as donors’ 
dependence on recipient’s energy resources. Donors give aid to their partners to maintain their 
relationship and to secure the energy supply. The geopolitical interests determine donors’ 
decision on the overall aid distribution rather than on the sectoral aid. Although loosely related, 
more imports of energy resources are expected to have a positive effect on NHRE aid flow. 
Regarding climate change, donors strategically give aid to recipients to recruit 
developing countries in the binding GHG reduction targets. Donors with high interest in 
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climate change and renewable energy would be active in international climate change accord 
and impose renewable energy policy. Thus, I measure donor strategic interest with commitment 
to the KP, share of electricity from renewable energy and patents on renewable energy 
technologies of donor countries. Having committed to the KP clearly shows donors’ strategic 
interest in recruiting recipients in the binding targets. Commitment to the KP is a binary 
variable being a unity if a donor signed the KP and did not withdraw.46 Both the share of 
electricity from renewable energy and patents on renewable energy technologies are the 
outcome of the renewable energy policy, which measures the stringency and effectiveness of 
renewable energy policies in donor countries. Data for these two variables were obtained from 
World Bank and OECD respectively. As donors commit to climate change action and renewable 
energy policy, they have high incentive to attract developing countries. The expected effects of 
these variables are positive on providing renewable energy aid. 
Commercial interests  
Post-Cold War, donor motivation in aid allocation appeared to re-focus on development goals. 
However, the accelerating globalization led donors to be more interested in commercial benefits 
than political ties. Commercial interests bring the economic profits back to donor countries. 
One way to realize this commercial interest is giving aid to their trade partners in the 
expectation of continuous exports to the recipients. Previous studies measure this trade interest 
by as export share (Dollar and Levin, 2006; Clist, 2011) and as trade flow (Hoeffler and Outram, 
2011). Given the donor interest in continuing and expanding exports, I use a recipient country’s 
share of total exports from the donor country. This measures the importance of the recipient as a 
market to the donor.  
46 A donor who signed the KP has value of 1 from 1998 and after; 0 before 1998. 
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Specific to the emerging technologies, a wide coverage of a donor’s technology increases 
the opportunity of becoming the global standard (Martens, 2005). Renewable energy 
technologies are relatively newer technologies in the energy sector. Thus, giving aid to as many 
countries as possible might be a donor strategy to become the global standard. The number of 
recipient countries receiving aid from a donor measures donor intention to spread its 
technology, expecting the effect to be positive. I calculate the number of recipients per donor as 
the number of total recipients receiving aid from a donor minus one so it excludes the recipient 
country in a donor-recipient pair. 
Good Governance 
Recent studies on foreign aid find that the effectiveness of aid is conditional on good policies 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) or good governance (Neumayer, 2003). In a 
donor’s strategy, allocating aid in recipient countries with good policies/governance would raise 
the effectiveness of aid.  In this study, I used the level of democracy (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Neumayer, 2003; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Clist, 2011) measured by political rights index and civil 
liberty index from Freedom House. I expect good governance to have a positive impact on 
NHRE aid, consistent with the findings from the literature.  
Specific to renewable energy, the willingness in sustainability is important in implementing 
renewable energy projects.  A recipient more willing to implement renewable projects will seek 
funding sources from domestic sources to foreign assistance. Thus, higher willingness would 
draw more aid in the renewable energy sector.  A dummy variable for renewable energy policy is 
constructed from the IEA’s renewable energy policy for the willingness in sustainability of 
recipient countries. 
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Recipient needs  
Poverty reduction is the foremost goal of foreign aid. The literature measured the poverty level of 
recipients using national income. Although this study particularly focuses on the energy sector, 
poor countries often suffer from energy poverty as well.  Hence, poverty would increase the 
amount of aid on renewable energy received (especially in terms of selection).  In this study, GNI 
per capita measures the level of poverty in a recipient country, which is expected to have a 
negative impact on aid with its inverse relation to poverty. 
Energy need is a sector-specific factor of recipient needs in this study.  This variable is also 
directly related to the main goal of foreign aid, poverty reduction.  Intuitively, people in extreme 
poverty are the ones without proper access to energy, disabling their everyday activities such as 
cooking, washing and transporting. Thus, energy needs ultimately meet the aim of general aid. I 
use the actual value of each per capita residential electricity use and per capita energy 
consumption to measure the energy need of a recipient country.47 According to IEA (2010), per 
capita residential electricity use denotes the reliability of electricity supply and the residents’ 
ability to pay for electricity. Per capita energy consumption denotes the level of economic 
development of a country. OECD (2010) states that high-income developing countries consume 
more energy from more diverse energy sources than low-income developing countries. Thus, 
lower energy use indicates higher energy needs of the country. Given the inverse relationship, I 
expect the energy use has negative impact on foreign aid on renewable energy. 
47 To measure the energy need, IEA developed the Energy Development Index (EDI). The index is calculated by using four 
indicators: Per capita commercial energy consumption, per capita electricity consumption in the residential sector, share of modern fuels in total 
residential sector energy use and share of population with access to electricity.47 However, I did not use EDI because the index only covers 
time series from 2004.  
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The gravity model in international trade describes bilateral trade flow proportional to the 
product of trade, which is Gross Domestic Products. In this study, I also use Gross Domestic 
Products as the product of aid, measuring economic advancement of a country. Bilateral aid aims 
to promote economic development of a recipient country, while the commercial interest 
signified with the globalization would also result in economic development of a donor country.  
The gravity model of international trade describes the bilateral trade inversely 
proportional to the distance between the two countries. Following this, the gravity model of 
bilateral aid also describes bilateral aid inversely proportional to the distance between the donor 
and the recipient. Especially in the renewable energy, procurement of physical equipment is 
necessary. Thus, physical distance indicates the level of transportation costs. Also, geopolitical 
relations make donors more likely to give aid to nearby recipients to enhance their regional 
political influence. The distance between two countries is acquired from the CEPII website.48 
The effect of distance is expected to be negative because longer distance would hinder aid 
transactions because of high transportation costs and low geopolitical interests.  
Given the data collected, I constructed an unbalanced donor-recipient pair-year panel 
from 1995 to 2009.49 The panel is once limited to the availability of commitments, then to the 
availability of migration data.50 Table III-2 presents variables to measure each determinant of 
NHRE aid flow and their descriptive statistics. Population of recipients is added to control for 
the size of recipient countries.  
[Insert Table III-2 here] 
48 Nelson and Silva (2008) used the same dataset. http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm  
49 See appendix for lists of donors and recipients included in the analysis  
50 For some donor-recipient pairs of immigration, missing values are not zero immigration but just not recorded. Thus, I limit the 
panel having donor-recipient pairs with consecutive observations on immigration. 
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5. Empirical Model 
After the Cold War, donors began diverting their selection criteria from political interest. 
Donors changed their aid giving behavior to a philanthropic focus. To begin investigating 
renewable energy aid distribution patterns, I examine bilateral aid on renewable energy at the 
donor-recipient pair level.  
I adopt the gravity model of international trade to investigate the determinants of aid 
flow. Trade literature typically specifies the gravity model as a log-linear regression and adds 
more independent variables affecting trade flow (Liu, 2007).  Regarding foreign aid, the simplest 
gravity model describes the aid flow (A) proportional to economic advancement (Y) of both a 
donor (i) and a recipient (j) and inversely proportional to the distance (D) between the two.  
i j
ij
ij
YY
A
D
γ=
  (1)
 
Taking the log-linear form and adding other independent variables, the final specification to 
estimate is:  
[ ]1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln lnijt it jt ij ijt it ijtA Y Y D X Zα β β β β β ε     = + + + + + +        (2) 
where X is a vector of the donor interests including political and commercial interests, Z is a 
vector of the recipient-related variables, recipient’s good governance and the recipient needs, 
and ε is an error term.  
Given a number of zero observations in the data, literature used diverse estimating 
techniques to estimate consistent effects of independent variables: OLS, Tobit and Poisson 
models in trade literature using the gravity equation (Liu, 2007) and OLS, Tobit, Heckman’s two 
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stage model, and two-part model in aid allocation literature controlling for selection process 
(Berthelemy, 2006). Given the selection process built in the aid allocation, OLS estimator will 
produce biased coefficients. The second option is a Tobit estimator that does not model the 
selection and allocation process of donors in theory. The estimator treats independent variables 
having the same effect on both selection and allocation processes. With the same reason, the 
Poisson model does not provide theoretical ground in estimating two stages of aid distribution.51  
The third option in aid literature is the Heckman model with a two-step process for 
selection and allocation, modeling the real-world more closely. The estimator treats the 
censored data as having an omitted variable problem, requiring an additional variable that is 
correlated to the selection process but not to the allocation process. Finding such an excluded 
variable is difficult in practice (Neumayer, 2003; Clist, 2010). Thus, I turn to the fourth option, 
two-part model.  
The two-part model separates the selection process and the allocation process. The 
selection process is estimated by logit or probit, modeling being selected or not. Then, the 
allocation process is estimated by linear regression conditional on the selected group, receiving 
positive aid amount in this case. The assumption of the two-part model is the errors in the 
selection process and the allocation process are independent of each other. If the assumption is 
true, the model does not need an excluded variable for selection process. Even if the assumption 
fails, Manning et al. (1987) found that introduced bias is small in most common situations.52 
Based on the merit, I mainly use two-part model in estimating the model (2).  
51 Additionally, the Poisson model is not appropriate estimating aid flow (the monetary observations as a unit of analysis) 
because the model works with dependent variable being count data (i.e. integer), which is not the case here. 
52 See Neumayer (2003) and Clist (2011) for more detailed description of the two-part model. 
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6. Results 
I report the estimated coefficients from the selection and allocation stages separately. Table III-3 
summarizes the results of the selection stage using logit and probit estimators. The first column 
reports the results of fixed effect logit estimator conditional on pairs. The second and the third 
columns report the results of random probit estimator with donor specific effect and both donor 
and recipient specific effects, respectively. Having pair-fixed effect, the conditional logit 
estimator in column (1) omits pair-specific variables, the distance between capitals and being a 
former colony index. Compared to probit estimators in columns (2) and (3), the conditional 
logit estimator has higher coefficients. However, the relative values among the variables within 
an estimator are similar both in the logit and probit estimators. 
[Insert Table III-3 here] 
Because the unit of analysis is a donor-recipient pair, the statistical significance indicates 
two types of selection processes. First, an independent variable of donor characteristics drives 
the decision of donors to be a donor when statistically significant. The second type of selection 
process is an independent variable of recipient characteristics drives the decision of donors in 
selecting recipients. In all three columns, the gravity effect and donors commercial interest drive 
selecting into a donor-recipient pair: donors decision to give aid on NHRE projects and donors 
decision on choosing recipients.  
The donors’ commercial interest is a major driver for being a NHRE aid donor. In all 
three models, the number of recipients is statistically significant. Controlling for donors’ wealth, 
having more recipients represents donor’s commercial interest of expanding their markets as 
well as their political influence. NHRE is a newer and growing technology in the energy sector. 
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Being the first comer would benefit donors in the future market of NHRE. In contrast, being a 
major trade partner does not guarantee receiving NHRE aid from a donor.  
Regarding the gravity effect, donors choose to give aid to nearby recipients (distance of a 
pair). This donor behavior becomes more intense when controlling for recipient specific effect in 
column (3). This physical proximity offers donors reduced transaction costs that come with aid 
giving.53 Transportation of physical capital or human resources costs less if they choose 
recipients close by. Because donors bare most of the costs related to aid giving, they minimize 
the costs in choosing recipients.  
The wealth of a donor does not affect a donor’s decision to be a donor (donor GDP). 
However, the wealth of a recipient might affect a donor’s decision to provide aid. In column (2) 
without recipient fixed effect, the wealth of a recipient is statistically significant and influences 
the decision of a donor in choosing wealthier recipients. Connecting to the donor’s commercial 
interests, wealthier recipients have higher buying potential, thus have higher market potential 
than the poor. Meanwhile, it also indicates that donors seek recipients with better capacity to 
receive aid in terms of economic activities. Similarly, the size of recipients’ population matters 
when choosing recipients. In columns (1) and (3), recipient specific effects wipe out the 
statistical significance of population in selecting recipients. Column (2) indicates populous 
recipients have higher odds of being selected to receiving NHRE aid. However, the magnitude of 
the effect is very small, implying that donors’ first attempt to meet their commercial interests. 
In contrast to the above factors, donor political interests and recipients’ good governance 
do not influence the decision of being a donor and of choosing recipients in the NHRE sector. 
53 Gravity model literature regards distance between two countries as a loose proxy for transaction costs. See Gomez-Herrera 
(2013). 
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The diluted effect of donors’ political interests is expected given the sample period being the 
post- Cold War era. We can observe donors are more interested in their commercial benefits 
post-1995. Even the strategic interest directly related to renewable energy turns out to have 
statistically equal to zero effects.  
Surprisingly, good governance in recipients has statistically zero effect. This result is 
against what Dollar and Levin (2006) note as donors increasingly condition on good governance 
when they choose recipients. The rationale behind it is good governance in a recipient country 
would raise the effectiveness of aid. However, limiting recipient countries in terms of good 
governance might fail to help those in serious need. As Clist (2011) states, donors are not 
sensitive to recipients’ governance. The results in Table 3 indicate good governance does not 
determine donor decision in giving aid to a recipient in the renewable energy sector.  
Recipient need also has statistically zero effect in receiving NHRE aid when controlling 
recipient specific effects. However, proxies of recipient need do not vary over time significantly. 
Including time-invariant recipient specific effects takes statistical significance away. GNI and 
residential electricity use are statistically significant at only the 5 percent level in column (2). 
Although weak, the signs are as expected. Poorer (lower GNI) recipients and recipients in 
higher energy poverty are more likely to receive NHRE aid.  In addition, population also shows 
statistical significance only in column (2) not controlling recipient specific effects. When 
selecting recipients, donors focus more on their commercial interests and reducing transaction 
costs than on the need of recipient or the effectiveness of aid from good governance.  
Having selected recipients, donors now decide how much to allocate their financial 
resources among the recipients. The estimated effects are in Table III-4 from random effect 
models in column (1) with donor fixed effects and (2) with donor and recipient fixed effects, 
  
95 
 
pair fixed effect model in column (3), and Tobit model in column (4). At first, donors emphasize 
more on selecting recipients than allocating the amount of aid among the recipients. Donors 
consider more categories in selecting recipients than in allocating aid. However, having recipient 
fixed effect reduces the statistical significance or drops the time-invariant recipient 
characteristics in columns (2) and (3) respectively. Counting different model specification, 
donors allocate NHRE aid among recipients based on the physical proximity and the recipient 
need.  
[Insert Table III-4 here] 
As found in the selection stage, physical proximity drives the amount of aid given to a 
recipient. In random effect models in column (1) and (2), the coefficients of logged distance is 
around -.35. This indicates if a donor-recipient pair is 10 percent closer than the other, the 
recipient will receive 3.5 percent higher aid on NHRE. For example, Washington DC is 6147 km 
from Rabat, Morocco and 6792 km from Algiers, Algeria. Rabat is about 10 percent closer to DC 
in distance than Algiers. Thus, Morocco would receive 3.5 percent higher aid on NHRE than 
Algeria, all others being equal.  
Contrary to the selection process, donors do care about recipient needs when allocating 
the amount of aid among the recipients. More importantly, donors seem to care about the 
sectoral needs of renewable energy use in recipients when allocating aid. The use of renewable 
energy hardly changes in recipient countries, thus dropping statistical significance.  
As a robustness check, I included the estimated results of Tobit model in column (4). 
The results follow both the selection and allocation stages. Wealth of a recipient, physical 
proximity, the number of recipients and population are all statistically significant as in the 
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selection stage. Whereas, Tobit estimator does not have statistical significance of renewable 
energy use in recipients as found in the allocation stage of the two-part model. Tobit model 
seems to better estimate the selection process than the allocation process because it includes all 
available donor-recipient pair regardless of being selected. In contrast, two-part model only 
includes donor-recipient pair selected by donors. Thus, two-part model can better estimate the 
allocation process with less noise from the data.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines what drives aid distribution. From the results, it is obvious that donors 
have separate priorities in selecting recipients and allocating the amount of aid among the 
recipients. First, donors select recipients based on their self-interests, specifically by their 
commercial interests. Even the political interests of energy security closely relates to supporting 
donor’s economic activities. In addition, richer donors are more willing to be a donor in the 
NHRE sector. Fortunately, donors are not always selfish. Once recipients are selected, they do 
care who needs aid.  Although donors would still seek the opportunity to reduce transaction 
costs through physical proximity, they allocate resources based on the sectoral need.  
From the policy perspective, it seems natural that bilateral donors make their decision 
based on their interests. A finding in this study is donors’ interests have changed from political 
to commercial, confirming findings in literature. Future researches picking up this topic should 
look into multilateral donors. Finding out whether they really base their decision on the 
recipient needs will shed light on the delivery of aid for better serving the poor. However, 
multilateral donors may focus more on the overall domestic situation in recipient countries than 
sectoral needs. An interview with a former consultant of aid project reveals donors condition 
their aid commitment on reframing recipients’ policy structure, which would delay serving the 
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individual poor. In this regard, future research can also investigate the interactions among 
policies when giving aid. 
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Figure III-1. Non-hydro Renewable energy aid from bilateral donors 
Figure shows the number of projects starting in a year (solid line) and the amount committed in 
the pipeline in a year (the dashed line) during 1995-2009.  The number of projects is on the left 
axis, and the amount of USD committed to NHRE aid is on the right axis. 
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Table III-1. Top 20 recipients of Japanese and German aid (1995-2009) 
 Japan Germany 
 NHRE Total Energy NHRE Total Energy 
1 China India India India 
2 Indonesia Indonesia Egypt Egypt 
3 Egypt Vietnam Brazil Pakistan 
4 Philippines China  Morocco Serbia 
5 Brazil Philippines Pakistan China 
6 Vietnam Malaysia  China Nepal  
7 Morocco Iraq  Chile Morocco  
8 Tunisia Sri Lanka Turkey Bangladesh 
9 Sri Lanka Bangladesh Croatia Indonesia  
10 Uruguay Azerbaijan  Bangladesh Georgia  
11 Maldives Thailand  Namibia Brazil  
12 Yemen, Rep. Pakistan  Serbia Armenia 
13 Djibouti Peru  South Africa Chile  
14 Palestinian Adm. Areas Egypt  Uganda Sri Lanka 
15 Mongolia Syria  Nepal Albania  
16 Micronesia, Fed. States Kenya  Afghanistan South Africa 
17 Marshall Islands Uzbekistan  Bosnia and Herzegovina Afghanistan  
18 Belize Nepal  Mongolia Croatia  
19 Palau Paraguay  Indonesia Philippines  
20 Nigeria Armenia  Senegal Kenya  
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Table III-2. Descriptive statistics  
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variable      
 
NHRE aid commitments (Million 
USD) 2090  0.81  9.24  0  287.132  
Independent variables      
Political interests Former colony (dummy) 2090 0.12  0.33  0  1 
 
Immigrants from recipient to 
donor (Million) 2090  0.16  0.84  0  11.74  
 
Import of natural gas from 
recipient (Million tonnes) 2090  0.008  0.12  0  2.68  
 
Import of crude oil from recipient 
(Million tonnes) 2090  0.82  6.08  0  81.78  
 
Number of patents for NHRE 
technologies 2090 66.83 166.36 0 1190.58 
 
Share of electricity generation from 
NHRE sources (%) 2090 5.06 4.94 0.20 27.61 
 
Commitment to Kyoto Protocol 
(dummy) 2090 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Commercial Share of exports with a recipient in 
a donor's total exports  2090  0.002  0.007  0  0.11  
 Number of recipients receiving a 
donor's aid 2090 6.38  7.38  0  44 
Good Governance Political rights (index) 2090 3.96  1.89  1  7 
 Civil liberty (index) 2090 3.95  1.36  1 7 
 Renewable energy policy (dummy) 2090 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Recipient need 
Recipient GNI (Million USD per 
capita) 2090 0.002  0.002  0.00011 0.013 
 
Renewable energy consumption in 
the commercial and public sectors 
(ktoe per million capita) 2090 356.96  1253.87  0 6334.19 
 
Electricity consumption in 
residential sector (ktoe per million 
capita) 2090 2761.86  5978.66  0 41900.6 
Gravity factor 
Recipient GDP (Million USD per 
capita) 2090 0.002  0.002  0.0001 0.014 
 
Donor GDP (Million USD per 
capita) 2090 0.027  0.008  0.013 0.042 
 Distance between capitals (km) 2090 7711.31  3228.47  277.88 17836.2 
Control variable Population of recipient (Million) 2090 179.48  362.56  1.65 1331.38 
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Table III-3. Estimated effects in the selection stage (DV: log of NHRE aid commitment) 
 
Fixed logit 
(1) 
Random probit 
(2) 
Random probit 
(3) 
Gravity factor    
Log of recipient GDP 1.768 0.157** 0.17  
 (2.022) (0.054) (0.217) 
Log of donor GDP 7.088 0.773 0.833 
 (4.428) (0.4561) (0.459) 
Log of distance between capitals   -0.043** -0.100*** 
  (0.015) (0.028) 
Political interests    
Colony    0.003  -0.013 
  (0.029) (0.034) 
Immigrants  -0.579 0.012  -0.003  
 (0.486) (0.026) (0.028) 
Natural Gas import 0.858  0.041  0.130 
 (1.483) (0.056) (0.075) 
Crude oil import -0.098 -0.001 -0.00006 
 (0.062) (0.004) (0.004) 
NHRE patents 0.001 0.00009 0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Share of NHRE -0.048 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) 
Kyoto Protocol -1.872 -0.153 -0.146 
 (1.245) (0.117) (0.119) 
Commercial interests    
Number of recipient 0.244*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share in donor trade partners 19.514  -2.141 -2.509 
 (29.257) (1.736) (1.929) 
Good governance    
Political rights -0.054 0.004  -0.005 
 (0.121) (0.010) (0.015) 
Civil liberty -0.148 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.209) (0.015) (0.023) 
Renewable energy policy 0.079  0.030  -0.003 
 (0.255) (0.019) (0.028) 
Recipient need    
GNI -0.497 -0.034* -0.072 
 (0.497) (0.016) (0.060) 
Renewable Energy use  0.032  -0.001 0.004  
 (0.037) (0.002) (0.004) 
Electricity use in residential sector 0.015  -0.0015* 0.002  
 (0.016) (0.0006) (0.002) 
Population -0.002 0.0001*** 0.00003 
 (0.005) (0.00002) (0.0005) 
Year dummy ˅ ˅ ˅ 
Donor dummy  ˅ ˅ 
Recipient dummy   ˅ 
Pair fixed effect ˅ (156)   
Number of observations 1,898 2,144 2,090 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; marginal effect is reported for probit models 
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Table III-4. Estimated effects in the allocation stage (DV: log of NHRE aid commitment) 
 
Random effect 
(1) 
Random effect 
(2) 
Fixed effect 
(3) 
Tobit 
(4) 
Gravity factor     
Log of recipient GDP 0.163 -2.260 -1.961 0.712* 
 (0.295) (1.782) (1.926) (0.330) 
Log of donor GDP 0.565 1.214 0.296 4.944 
 (3.675) (3.899) (4.587) (2.589) 
Log of distance between capitals -0.350*** -0.343**  -0.302*** 
 (0.105) (0.130)  (0.091) 
Political interests     
Colony  -0.146 -0.019  -0.098 
 (0.168) (0.179)  (0.185) 
Immigrants  0.122 0.094 1.854 0.068 
 (0.134) (0.248) (1.741) (0.158) 
Natural Gas import -0.252* 0.167 0.081 0.096 
 (0.107) (0.139) (0.237) (0.326) 
Crude oil import -0.009 -0.012 -0.125 -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.042) (0.083) (0.021) 
NHRE patents -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Share of NHRE 0.025 0.014 0.008 -0.027 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.046) (0.022) 
Kyoto Protocol -0.168 -0.585 -0.243 -0.694 
 (0.551) (0.692) (0.715) (0.537) 
Commercial interests     
Number of recipient 0.003 0.011 0.026 0.135*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) 
Share in donor trade partners -11.765 -15.484 97.127 -3.095 
 (18.429) (19.319) (95.503) (12.606) 
Good governance     
Political rights 0.060 0.071 0.094 0.040 
 (0.062) (0.087) (0.110) (0.055) 
Civil liberty -0.030 -0.143 -0.196 -0.053 
 (0.083) (0.133) (0.155) (0.081) 
Renewable energy policy 0.140 0.165 0.191 0.141 
 (0.129) (0.231) (0.247) (0.104) 
Recipient need     
GNI -0.052 0.162 0.432 -0.163 
 (0.075) (0.558) (0.523) (0.098) 
Renewable Energy use  -0.017** 0.001 0.003 -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.023) (0.017) (0.010) 
Electricity use in residential -0.005 -0.0002 0.004 -0.008* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.021) (0.003) 
Population 0.00024 -0.004 -0.009 0.0006*** 
 (0.000157) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000162) 
Constant 1.624 -0.627 1.851 -17.426 
 (12.886) (13.091) (13.628) (8.964) 
Donor dummy ˅ ˅  ˅ 
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Recipient dummy ˅ ˅   
Pair fixed effect   ˅  
Number of observations 395 395 395 2,161 
Log likelihood   -378.047 -1081.901 
Number of donor-recipient pair 159 159 159 249 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses; year dummies not reported 
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Appendix III-1. List of donors and recipients in the sample pairs  
Table III-A. Bilateral aid donors in the sample 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
Table III-B. Bilateral aid recipients in the sample 
Albania Dominican Republic Nicaragua 
Algeria Ecuador Pakistan 
Argentina Egypt Peru 
Armenia Eritrea Philippines 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Senegal 
Bangladesh Guatemala Slovenia 
Belarus Honduras South Africa 
Benin India Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Indonesia Tanzania 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Iran Thailand 
Botswana Jordan Togo 
Brazil Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Cameroon Kenya Turkey 
Chile Malaysia Ukraine 
China Mexico Venezuela 
Colombia Morocco Vietnam 
Costa Rica Mozambique Yemen 
Croatia Namibia Zimbabwe 
Cuba Nepal 
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Conclusion 
The three essays in this dissertation ponder how to expand the usage of renewable energy 
technologies to all corners of the world. The results from the first essay suggest that energy 
supply security influences innovation of renewable energy technologies. Specifically, the 
domestic oil endowment influences shaping the innovation pattern of a country. Oil is a 
commodity traded in a global market; it is not expected to have an impact on domestic activities. 
The findings contradict an expectation from the traditional economic theories and imply there 
are political economic factors to technology innovation in the renewable energy sector. Further 
studies on this notion will contribute to methods for shaping a sustainable path in the energy 
and climate change sector.  
The second essay demonstrates foreign aid is an effective diffusion channel of renewable 
energy technologies to developing countries. The results suggest that intangible knowledge 
substantially increases technological capacity of recipient countries. However, intangible 
knowledge transferred through foreign aid is often attached to the physical capital transfer. In 
other words, foreign aid is often a mix of cooperative aid and non-cooperative aid. Future 
research is needed to explore the optimal mix of cooperative and non-cooperative aid in raising 
aid effectiveness. In addition to the optimal mix, another question for future research is the 
design of cooperative aid. Technical cooperation is different depending on the recipients’ 
existing technological capacity. Although China has the capacity to manufacture physical 
capitals, small and low income developing countries are better off learning how to conduct a 
feasibility study for potential renewable energy projects. Thus, customizing the cooperation 
design to individual countries will raise the aid effectiveness when combined with the optimal 
fraction of cooperative aid.  
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The third essay presents how developed countries select aid recipients based on their 
commercial interests but allocate the amount of aid based on the recipient need among the 
selected recipients in the renewable energy sector. Findings on selecting aid recipients illustrate 
how to sell diffusion of renewable energy technologies to developed countries; it brings them 
commercial benefits. On the other hand, findings on allocating aid raise a topic for future 
researches: multilateral aid. As more aid regarding climate change is flowing through 
multilateral agencies, comparing determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid elucidates a 
better delivery of aid in serving the poor. Combining with the results from the second essay, 
these findings shed light on the design of future assistance to diffuse renewable energy 
technologies in terms of cooperative level (the second essay) and marketing strategy to bilateral 
donors (the third essay). 
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